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Counterrevolution?—National Criminal Law 
After Raich±
GEORGE D. BROWN∗
This Article provides an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Gonzales v. Raich and its ramifications. The Court rejected by a 
margin of six to three a Ninth Circuit holding that the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act would probably be found unconstitutional as applied to 
intrastate users of marijuana who were in conformity with California’s 
Compassionate Use Act. Although the majority, and Justice Scalia 
concurring, found the case to present a relatively straightforward problem 
in the application of Commerce Clause doctrine, the three dissenters 
(Justice O’Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas) 
sounded sharp notes decrying a betrayal of New Federalism principles as 
well as an abandonment of United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison. 
The Article begins with a detailed analysis of the four different opinions 
that the case generated in the Supreme Court, as well as a look at the Ninth 
Circuit decision. The lower court’s willingness to prefer state law over 
federal, as well as the strong federalism themes of the Supreme Court 
dissents, represent important data points in any overall debate about 
federalism. The Article also devotes substantial attention to the use by 
Justices Stevens and Scalia of Wickard v. Filburn. Wickard, with its 
aggregation principle, has long been a sore point for conservatives. 
However, no justice in Raich called for its overruling, and the Wickard-
based analysis of class-of-activities statutes emerged stronger than ever.  
The second Part of the Article discusses the potential impact of Raich on the 
current Court’s New Federalism initiative. I contend that to adopt the view 
of the Ninth Circuit would have constituted a substantial advance of that set 
of precepts. However, the fact that Raich came out the way it did does not 
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necessarily constitute a rollback for the New Federalism. In particular, 
Justice Stevens’ insistence on the need for an economic/commercial subject 
of regulation as the overall test of validity of statutes with a purported effect 
on interstate commerce represents a reaffirmation of Lopez and Morrison. 
The open question is whether his lack of reference to the nonattenuation or 
noninfinity arguments of the majority in those cases represents any form of 
retreat. 
In the third Part I consider some implications of Raich for the federal 
criminal law. The Article presents the case as supporting the view that the 
American system will continue to be noteworthy for the presence of two 
largely overlapping sets of criminal statutes. The Article also examines 
specific issues such as the use of jurisdictional elements, as-applied 
challenges, and the reach of federal criminal law at the outer boundaries of 
national authority. The cases involving federal prosecution for child 
pornography are used to illustrate this latter problem as well as to provide 
a further elucidation of the general discussion of the current status of 
federal criminal laws, particularly those passed under the Commerce 
Clause.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Gonzales v. Raich1 the Supreme Court called a halt to the New 
Federalism.2 The Court could have altered the constitutional landscape by 
striking down a federal criminal statute3 prohibiting marijuana as part of a 
comprehensive regulation of drugs—when applied to purely intrastate 
conduct. State law—the California Compassionate Use Act4—permitted the 
conduct. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had invalidated the federal 
 
 
1 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
2 The term “New Federalism” encompasses many issues. Prominent among them are 
the following: state sovereignty and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see, e.g., 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); limits on federal ability to “commandeer” the 
institutions of state government, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); 
and, limits on federal regulatory authority under the enumerated powers of the 
Constitution, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Raich involves a 
variant on the issue present in Lopez—whether federal power to regulate a criminal 
matter is lacking, thus leaving the area to the states. For an excellent introduction to the 
New Federalism, see Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS 
L.J. 431 (2002). For a critical assessment of the enterprise, particularly the central role of 
notions of state sovereignty, see Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1601 (2002). 
3 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
2005] NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH  
 
949
                                                                                                                  
statute “as applied,”5 relying heavily on two pillars of the New Federalism—
United States v. Lopez6 and United States v. Morrison.7 The appeals court 
had also used language central to the debate over federal criminal law: “[I]t is 
particularly important that in the field of criminal law enforcement, where 
state power is preeminent, national authority be limited to those areas in 
which interstate commerce is truly affected . . . .The police power is, 
essentially, reserved to the states . . . .”8 The Supreme Court disagreed, 
reversing the Ninth Circuit by a margin of six to three.9 It emphasized the 
supremacy of federal law, and the ability of valid regulations of interstate 
commerce to reach broadly into intrastate activity. Raich was a 
straightforward case that could be answered on the basis of “[w]ell-settled 
law.”10
Noticeably absent from Justice Stevens’ majority opinion were any 
references to federalism in general, or to such specific staples of New 
Federalism rhetoric as state sovereignty, spheres of state authority, the 
special status of criminal law enforcement as a state function, or the need to 
confine the national government in order to assure some form of balance. 
Instead, Justice Stevens treated the case as presenting a classic Commerce 
Clause problem.11 He relied heavily on Wickard v. Filburn,12 a problem case 
for many conservatives.13
It is in the dissents of Justices O’Connor and Thomas14 that one finds 
sharp, almost anguished, invocations of federalism themes. They saw Lopez 
and Morrison as pushed to the margins of constitutional analysis, reduced to 
little more than drafting guides.15 The beast that had been slain in those 
cases—the contention that, because everything is somehow connected to 
commerce at some level of abstraction, this interconnectedness permits use 
 
 
5 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
6 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
7 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
8 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618). 
9 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
10 Id. at 2201. 
11 Id. at 2198–99. 
12 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
13 United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231–33 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J., 
dissenting); see Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 12–13, Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1454). 
14 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. at 2223 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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of the Commerce Clause to regulate everything—had reared its head again.16 
For them, the rejection of such reasoning is central to whatever one might 
mean by a New Federalism. This Article will refer to this position as the 
nonattenuation or noninfinity principle. Lopez and Morrison are good 
examples of the principle at work. It was in part because highly attenuated 
arguments of interconnectedness were key to justifying the Gun Free School 
Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act that the Court struck down 
these statutes.17
In Raich itself, the validity of the general federal law at issue in the 
case—the Controlled Substances Act and its regulation of the interstate 
market in drugs—was conceded by all parties.18 What was at issue was how 
far that law could extend to intrastate possession of a particular drug—
marijuana. This is a far different matter from the question in Lopez and 
Morrison, where any form of federal regulation was challenged. Another 
factor distinguishing Raich from other federal criminal law cases was the 
presence of a state law permitting what federal law prohibited.19 In most 
contexts, federal and state law are essentially parallel in forbidding the same 
sort of conduct.20 Joint enforcement efforts often occur.21 Not so here. The 
California Compassionate Use Act permitted limited use of drugs upon a 
doctor’s recommendation.22 The fact that federal law said otherwise was 
apparently irrelevant. As discussed at greater length below,23 I do not think 
that forbidding such a state override of federal law is a serious setback to the 
attempt to find balance in American Federalism. The Supremacy Clause 
 
 
16 Id. at 2225; id. at 2235–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an example of this 
reasoning, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620–25 (1995) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–616 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–67; see Craig M. 
Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 578 (2004) 
(referring to the “non-infinity” principle of Lopez).  
18 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2204 (2005). 
19 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
20 Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of 
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 921, 963 (1997).  
21 Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law 
Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 370 (2001); Litman & Greenberg, supra 
note 20, at 963. 
22 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1996). 
23 See infra Part III.A–B. 
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makes clear that even concurrent regulation is not an undertaking among 
equals.24
In order to get a general perspective of where the New Federalism stands 
after Raich, it is necessary to examine in detail the several opinions in the 
case with an eye to the important doctrinal battle being waged. This Article 
gives more space to the dissents than would normally be the case.25 They 
represent an initial New Federalist critique of Raich, as well as a glimpse at 
what might have been. What emerges from this examination is the 
conclusion that a counterrevolution did not occur.26 Raich is a setback for the 
New Federalism, but it is not a rollback to some form of Lopez-Lite or to the 
nonfederalism of Justices Breyer and Souter.27 This Article also uses Raich 
as a springboard to discuss several issues within the overall federal criminal 
law debate. The first is the current state of the debate itself, and which vision 
of federal criminal law and its relation to state law is furthered by the 
decision.28 A second issue is how challenges to particular federal criminal 
laws can be mounted.29 The Article considers the hotly contested question of 
whether courts may consider as-applied challenges to federal statutes 
regulating broad classes of activity. It concludes that Raich correctly 
validates such challenges.30 The Article next deals with the role of 
jurisdictional elements—provisions of a statute that require the government 
to prove a link between the conduct at issue and the federal power invoked.31 
Jurisdictional elements present serious problems and can easily permit an end 
run around the Court’s efforts to cabin national power. They are likely to be 
the next battleground in federal criminal law. Finally, as a way of tying these 
questions together, the Article examines the outer reaches of federal law 
through consideration of the current circuit conflict over federal power to ban 
child pornography.32 These cases raise issues of the possibility of as-applied 
challenges to federal statutes, the Commerce Clause reach of the latter into 
“purely intrastate, private” conduct, and the role of jurisdictional elements. It 
 
 
24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 
(1992) (explaining that “the Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government ‘a decided 
advantage in th[e] delicate balance’ the Constitution strikes between state and federal 
power”). 
25 See infra Part II.D–E. 
26 See infra Part V. 
27 See infra Part III. 
28 See infra Part III.A–B. 
29 See infra Part IV.A–C. 
30 See infra Part IV.D. 
31 See infra Part IV.E. 
32 See infra Part IV.F. 
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is highly significant that three weeks after Raich, the Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit, for consideration in light of Raich, a 
judgment invalidating a federal child pornography statute as applied.33 The 
outer reaches may indeed be expansive. 
 Part II of the Article analyzes the various opinions in Raich, both at the 
Supreme Court and the circuit court levels.34 Part III considers the impact of 
Raich on the New Federalism, and advances the argument that the New 
Federalism is alive and well after Raich, particularly if the nonattenuation 
principle retains its force.35 Part IV examines the federal criminal law 
debate36 and the specific questions alluded to in the previous paragraph. 
II. RAICH AND THE LIMITS OF LOPEZ 
A. The Ninth Circuit: Pushing the New Federalism Envelope 
This Article’s analysis of the case begins with the remarkable decision of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.37 The court invalidated a federal statute 
utilizing a mode of analysis purportedly derived from Lopez and Morrison, 
took a law regulating an entire class of activities and broke it down into 
subclasses, and utilized state law in defining the subclass of activities which 
federal law could not reach.38  
The case arose out of the clash between two statutes. The Federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) bans marijuana as a “Schedule I controlled 
substance.”39 Possession of a controlled substance is a criminal offense.40 
California, on the other hand, passed in 1996 the Compassionate Use Act.41 
The California Act permits use of marijuana for medical purposes when 
 
 
33 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 
(2005). The Supreme Court has vacated other decisions for consideration in light of 
Raich: United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 321 
(2005); Klingler v. Dir., Dep’t of Revenue, 366 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2899 (2005). 
34 See infra notes 37–193. 
35 See infra notes 194–296. 
36 See infra notes 297–455. 
37 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
38 Id. at 1228–35. 
39 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1970). 
40 Id. 
41 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
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recommended by a physician.42 A patient or a patient’s caregiver, who 
possesses or cultivates marijuana for medical treatment upon the 
recommendation of a physician, is exempt from state criminal anti-drug 
provisions. The two principal plaintiffs utilize marijuana as part of medical 
treatment that meets the standards of the Act. One cultivates her own supply; 
the other is given marijuana by friends.43 Federal and state officials 
confronted one of the plaintiffs in a “standoff” that led to federal agents 
seizing and destroying her six cannabis plants.44 The plaintiffs then brought a 
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States 
Attorney General and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency.  
The specific issue in Raich, as it was brought before the Ninth Circuit, 
was whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of success in their 
prayer for preliminary relief, which included a finding of likelihood that the 
court would ultimately declare the federal statute unconstitutional as to 
them.45 A divided panel found that the “appellants [had] demonstrated a 
strong likelihood of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA 
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause 
authority.”46 The key to the court’s analysis was its willingness to treat the 
plaintiffs as members of a particular subclass within the broader entity that 
the CSA regulates.47 Indeed, there was substantial circuit precedent to the 
effect that the CSA is a valid regulation of commerce.48 Any other 
conclusion as to the statute would seem impossible, given the extensive 
interstate market in drugs. However, the court was willing to excise the 
plaintiffs from that broader class, and defined their subclass in terms of “the 
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for 





43 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005). 
44 Id. 
45 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1228. 
48 See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 
1249–50 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1972). 
49 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229. 
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The court had, in effect, allowed an as-applied challenge to the CSA on 
the part of the class that it had identified and carved out from that statute. It 
then applied to that class a four-part test of validity, which it purported to 
find in Morrison and its refinement of Lopez.50 The first factor was stated as 
“whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic 
enterprise.”51 The court concluded that the cultivation and possession of 
marijuana under the circumstances presented could not be characterized as 
commercial or economic activity. It found dispositive the lack of any sale, 
exchange, or distribution.52 The government attempted to invoke Wickard v. 
Filburn53 in order to utilize its aggregation principle, but the court found that 
the noncommercial nature of the activity precluded any such application of 
Wickard.54 In particular, the Ninth Circuit viewed the marijuana at issue not 
as a fungible commodity, “as its use is personal and the appellants do not 
seek to exchange it or to acquire marijuana from others in a market.”55 The 
court then turned to the second factor: whether the statute contained any 
“‘express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a discrete set’ of 
cases.”56 The lack of a jurisdictional element in the CSA cut in the plaintiffs’ 
favor.57 As for the third factor—legislative findings—the Ninth Circuit noted 
that Congress had made findings in the Act itself, including a reference to 
local possession of controlled substances.58 Still, the court emphasized the 
lack of any direct finding on marijuana, much less intrastate medicinal use of 
marijuana.59 It also diluted the weight of the third factor by stating that 
“Morrison counsels courts to take congressional findings with a grain of 
salt.”60
Finally, the court turned to the fourth factor of the test that it had found 





52 Id. at 1229–30. 
53 Id. at 1230. 
54 Id. at 1230–31. 
55 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). The court had earlier acknowledged the existence of an 
interstate market in drug trafficking. Id. at 1228. 
56 Id. at 1229. 
57 Id. at 1231. 
58 Id. at 1232 (finding “local distribution and possession of controlled substances 
contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances”). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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substantial effect on interstate commerce is ‘attenuated.’”61 Lopez, 
Morrison’s predecessor, had dealt with a different problem.62 At issue was 
not the possible bearing of the nonattenuation principle on the extent of 
Congress’s ability to regulate an activity over which it clearly had power. 
Rather, the question was whether a general concern like the quality of the 
educational system could be invoked to justify regulation of a specific 
activity such as gun possession in school zones. Raich did present the first 
issue, and the court found the plaintiffs’ conduct to be remote from the 
statute’s regulatory ambit.63 In sum, the weighing of the four factors led the 
Ninth Circuit to conclude that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail.64 It also 
emphasized the fact that the field of criminal law was in issue, a field “where 
state power is preeminent.”65
The court of appeals departed from the pattern of virtually all lower 
courts that have navigated around Lopez to find federal criminal statutes 
valid.66 Instead, it found in Morrison the four-part test for evaluating the 
 
 
61 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S Ct. 2195 (2005). 
62 See infra notes 114–18. 
63 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233. 
64 Id. at 1234. 
65 Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)). Also, 
it should be noted that, in addition to the role that state law played in defining the class 
viewed as relevant by the court, the majority opinion brought the presence of state law 
into the case again, in listing the desirability of state experiments as one of the “public 
interest” factors that should be considered in an injunctive proceeding. Id. at 1235.  
Judge Beam, in a prescient dissent, viewed the case as a straightforward application 
of Wickard. Id. at 1235 (Beam, J., dissenting). He noted that the farmer in Wickard would 
have been held subject to federal regulation even if his conduct was viewed as 
noneconomic. Having made the inevitable comparison between the case before the court 
and the situation in Wickard, Judge Beam, admitting his own “redundancy,” applied the 
four Morrison factors. Unlike the majority, he found the statute valid as applied. Id. at 
1240. He viewed the activity as economic in that the marijuana grown was fungible and 
might be sold in the marketplace, and that plaintiffs’ reliance on it precluded their 
recourse to other products in the market. He also viewed regulation of intrastate 
possession as “essential to reaching the larger commercial activity” that Congress was 
validly regulating. Id. He admitted the lack of a jurisdictional element, viewed the 
findings as adequate, and essentially repeated his commercial arguments in the context of 
the fourth factor—the presence of an attenuated connection. Id. at 1241–43. Thus, both 
the “test” and Wickard led to different conclusions on the ultimate question: whether the 
activities of the plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, could be said to have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce—the touchstone for validity under Lopez. United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554–59 (1995).  
66 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 17, at 575; id. at 603–05 (noting limited impact of 
Lopez on lower court decisions). 
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constitutionality of a federal statute. While it is true that both Lopez and 
Morrison mentioned these factors prominently, neither presented them as a 
test to be applied mechanically to determine the question of a statute’s 
validity.67 Of course, before the circuit court could apply any such test to the 
plaintiffs’ claim, it had to treat them as members of a separate and distinct 
subclass, different from the general class that was validly regulated by the 
CSA. There is certainly no authority in Lopez and Morrison for this major 
analytical step: disaggregating a legislative class. Those cases did not even 
involve the problem.68  
Let us assume, for now, that an as-applied challenge is possible. It is far 
from clear that the four-part test is much help. For example, reading Lopez 
and Morrison as preferring a jurisdictional element does not seem to add 
much to the analysis. Some justices have apparently expressed a preference 
for statutes with a jurisdictional element, such as a requirement that the 
defendant’s conduct have an effect on commerce.69 Such elements both 
narrow the field of regulation and link particular cases to congressional 
power. However, Lopez was careful to accept and endorse the existing body 
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which includes major class-of-activity 
statutes, that is, those that do not require any individualized showing through 
a jurisdictional element.70 Famous examples of cases upholding such statutes 
are Wickard and Perez v. United States.71 Lopez would indeed have been a 
constitutional revolution if it cast serious doubt on class-of-activity statutes.  
The Ninth Circuit in Raich was correct in identifying the 
economic/commercial nature of a regulation as central to any Lopez-based 
inquiry as to its validity. The CSA passes that test, given the highly 
developed interstate market in drugs. The question, again, is whether the 
general regulated class can be somehow disaggregated to focus on those who 
do not participate in any discernible way in that market. In addition, one 
 
 
67 Morrison perhaps goes further, presenting the factors as “significant 
considerations [that] contributed to our decision.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 609 (2000). The Morrison majority also stated that in considering questions of 
substantial effect on commerce, Lopez “provides the proper framework for conducting 
the required analysis of [the statute in question].” Id.  
68 At issue was the basic constitutionality of the statutes involved, not their 
application to particular groups.  
69 See generally text accompanying notes 372–417 infra (discussing current status of 
jurisdictional elements). 
70 See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
71 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942). 
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should flag the circuit’s use of state law in carving out the class.72 The 
definition of the class, with its basis in state law, raises the troubling question 
of whether states can play a role in establishing the validity of federal 
regulation. The Supremacy Clause73 dictates otherwise. Finally, there is the 
suggestion that the fact that the statute regulates “‘the field of criminal law 
enforcement, where state power is preeminent’” should play a separate role 
in analyzing the statute’s validity.74 To accept this proposition would be a 
major step toward a strong version of the New Federalism.  
B. Raich—An Easy Case 
In Raich, Justice Stevens wrote the Supreme Court’s opinion reversing 
the decision below.75 He was joined by four justices. Justice Scalia joined the 
decision, but not the majority opinion. Like the circuit court, Justice Stevens 
began with Lopez76 as the analytical starting point for any Commerce Clause 
analysis of a challenged federal statute. However, that is virtually the only 
resemblance between his opinion and that of the court below. He viewed the 
matter as one of “well-settled law.”77 That law is the body of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence that Lopez (and Morrison) had maintained. Justice 
Stevens did not present those cases as departing from that body of law 
through the formulation of any new federalism-based “test,” against which to 
measure the validity of congressional statutes. Indeed, the opinion is 
noteworthy for its virtual lack of any reference to federalism. What he found 
present in Raich was the classic Commerce Clause issue of federal power to 
“regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of 
activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”78
Justice Stevens presented Lopez as the starting point for analysis,79 but 
the central case in his Commerce Clause discussion was Wickard.80 Wickard 
 
 
72 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (defining the class as “the intrastate, noncommercial 
cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by 
a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law”). 
73 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
74 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 
(9th Cir. 2003)). 
75 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
76 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
77 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201. 
78 Id. at 2205. 
79 Id. 
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was quoted initially for the proposition that “‘even if appellee’s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever 
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce.’”81 Justice Stevens used this analysis to repeat the 
Court’s openness to congressional legislation that regulates an entire class of 
activities.82 Having raised the class-of-activities issue, Justice Stevens then 
turned to the question of whether as-applied challenges are available in the 
case of such statutes. He repeated the famous quote from Maryland v. Wirtz83 
to the effect that when “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under that statute is of no consequence.”84
Nonetheless, he proceeded to perform a Wickard-driven analysis of the 
CSA in the context of the Raich challenge. He treated the challengers as 
analogous to the farmer cultivating wheat,85 even though one of the plaintiffs 
did not grow her own marijuana. For Justice Stevens, the marijuana, like the 
wheat in the earlier case, could seep into the interstate market.86 Using the 
“rational basis” test that had been applied in Lopez to give judicial review 
some teeth,87 he stated that, as in Wickard, there is “no difficulty”88 in 
concluding that “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving 
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect 
price and market conditions.”89 Thus, the requirement of a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce—the third category of congressional authority 
recognized in Lopez90—was satisfied.91
As with Wickard itself, there is a certain ambiguity as to whether the 
marijuana was at least a potential part of the interstate market that Congress 
could easily regulate under the Commerce Clause, or whether leaving it for 
“home” cultivation and consumption represented an instance where 
 
80 Id. at 2205–15. Cites to Wickard proliferate throughout this analysis. E.g., id. at 
2205–10.  
81 Id. at 2205–06 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). 
82 Id. at 2206.  
83 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
84 Id. at 196 n.27. 
85 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206–07 (2005). 
86 Id. at 2207. 
87 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995). 
88 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.  
89 Id.  
90 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
91 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208–09 (2005). 
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noncommercial activities might undercut regulation of an interstate market.92 
Either way, there would be a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Justice Stevens did not place major reliance on the argument that the 
plaintiffs, like the farmer in Wickard who might have bought his wheat in the 
interstate market if he did not grow his own, might have recourse to the 
interstate market.93 Overall, Wickard seems relevant for three particular 
propositions: (1) the possibility of diversion into the interstate market; (2) the 
risk of undercutting federal regulations; and (3) the possibility of aggregating 
the instances of admittedly local activity to the point at which they have an 
impact on interstate commerce.94  
Justice Stevens went on to explain why Lopez and Morrison did not 
support the plaintiffs’ challenge to the CSA, and to refute point-by-point 
their as-applied critique.95 As for Lopez and Morrison, he criticized the 
plaintiffs for reading those cases “far too broadly.”96 Furthermore, they 
presented statutory challenges quite different from those in Raich. Neither 
was an as-applied challenge to a “concededly valid statutory scheme.”97 
Rather, the facial challenge was whether the statute fell outside of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.98 The main defect of the 
statute in Lopez (the Gun-Free School Zones Act)99 was that it did not 
regulate economic activity or represent an essential part of a larger regulation 
of economic activity, “‘in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
 
 
92 See, e.g., id. at 2206–07. The fact that the regulation was a ban also brings the two 
arguments closer together. Justice Stevens stated that “[w]hen Congress decides that the 
‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the 
entire class.” Id. at 2206. 
93 He noted the possibility in a footnote. Id. at 2207 n.28. 
94 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 (stating that production of a commodity for home 
consumption has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market). Id. at 
2209 (finding a “rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA”). This 
portion of the opinion closed with another strong suggestion that the as-applied challenge 
could not have been brought in the first place. Having previously stated that “[w]e have 
never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude,” Justice Stevens 
concluded his analysis with the statement “[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely 
intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to 
excise individual components of that larger scheme.” Id. at 2206, 2209.  
95 Id. at 2209–15. 
96 Id. at 2209. 
97 Id. 
98 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 590, 604–05 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
99 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. 
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unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”100 The CSA, by contrast, is a 
classic general regulation of an admittedly economic problem.101 Justice 
Stevens stated that it is an example of a federal law that regulates 
“quintessentially economic” activities.102 The fact that it is, partially, a ban 
made no difference: “Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of 
an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of 
regulating commerce in that product.”103  
Justice Stevens went beyond contrasting the statutory backgrounds and 
proceeded to rebut the other components of the as-applied challenge.104 He 
reserved his strongest language for the proposition that state law could 
somehow set the class apart from intrastate possessors in general.105 In part, 
he saw this argument as a direct challenge to federal supremacy, clearly 
invalid given that “[t]he Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if 
there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall 
prevail.”106 The possibility of any such contention gave him the opportunity 
to accuse Justice Thomas, one of the dissenters, of attempting to “turn the 
 
 
100 Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
101 Morrison was of no greater help to the plaintiffs. Justice Stevens stated that:  
[L]ike the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded 
that ‘the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our 
decision’ in Lopez, and that our prior cases had identified a clear pattern of analysis: 
‘where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.’ 
Id. at 2210 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610) (alteration in original).  
102 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005). 
103 Id. (footnote omitted).  
104 The key to any such challenge was the definition of the relevant class of 
activities by the Ninth Circuit as “‘the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession 
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in 
accordance with state law.’” Id. (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)). The first 
component, that the use was for personal medical purposes on advice of a physician, 
could not save any such class. For Justice Stevens, Congress had considered possible 
medical uses of marijuana and rejected them. Id. at 2211–12. Thus, this purported aspect 
of the class was, in his view, tantamount to saying that personal use, regardless of the 
purpose, was an acceptable exemption from the Act. He had little difficulty in treating 
any such broad exemption as a fundamental conflict with the purposes of the CSA. Id. at 
2212 (stating that “[t]he congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant 
segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire 
regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity”). 
105 Id. at 2212–15.  
106 Id. at 2212. 
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Supremacy Clause on its head . . . .”107 Plaintiffs apparently did not utilize 
state law to exempt themselves from the general federal regulation, but to 
argue that those who complied with the Compassionate Use Act presented no 
danger of the seeping-into-the-market sort that Justice Stevens had 
hypothesized in applying Wickard.108 Their contention was that the “legal” 
usage would be tightly controlled: “a discrete activity that is hermetically 
sealed off from the larger interstate . . . market . . . .”109 He found this 
proposition one that Congress could have rationally rejected, and went to 
some lengths to demonstrate why.110 In the end, the plaintiffs’ only 
distinction was that, unlike participants in the interstate market, they engaged 
in “‘the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of 
marijuana.’”111 Any such contention was foreclosed by the CSA’s specific 
findings on interstate possession, the large commercial market for marijuana, 
and Wickard.112 
Given the importance of Raich, and the likelihood that it will be seen as a 
serious setback for the New Federalism as espoused in Lopez and Morrison, 
it is worth noting three significant omissions from the majority opinion. 
Justice Stevens did not present the issue as one of federalism in the way that 
Justice Rehnquist began Lopez in the ringing tones of starting “with first 
principles.”113 Indeed, there is no discussion of the constitutional vision in 
which a construction of the enumerated powers of the national government 
serves to enlarge or diminish those of the states. A second omission is any 
reference to such staples of the New Federalism as notions of traditional state 
authority, spheres in which states play a special role, the lack of a national 
police power, or heightened scrutiny when a basically state activity, such as 
the criminal law, is at issue.114 Finally, there is no invocation of the 
nonattenuation principle, or even a reference to the role that it played in 
Lopez and Morrison. In Morrison, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
referred to Lopez’s rejection of a “but-for reasoning” under which 
 
 
107 Id. at 2213 n.38. 
108 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2213–15 (2005). 
109 Id. at 2213. 
110 He viewed the medical exemption as likely to increase the supply of marijuana in 
the California market and foresaw a danger that unscrupulous users would take advantage 
of it. Id. at 2214. 
111 Id. at 2215 (citing Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
112 Id. 
113 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).  
114 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2222 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 572 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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“‘Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, 
divorce, and child custody).’”115 He went on to base his rejection of such 
attenuated chains of causation on the ground that “‘it is difficult to perceive 
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education, where States historically have been sovereign.’”116 
This reasoning played a central role in both Lopez and Morrison, cases which 
Justice Stevens treated as good law.117 The omission of any such reference is 
surprising. It is perhaps even more surprising given the fact that the lower 
court had invoked the nonattenuation principle in arguing that the plaintiffs’ 
marijuana had no connection to the market.118
C. Justice Scalia: A New Federalist Concurs 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, in an opinion he stylized as 
“more nuanced.”119 His vote is important both because it produced a more 
solid-looking six-three alignment, and because he was in the majority in 
Lopez and Morrison. Without his support, any attempt to extend those cases 
was doomed from the outset. It is not clear that Justice Scalia adds 
substantially to the Stevens analysis. His difference with the majority, if any, 
seems primarily methodological. Cases had routinely referred to the 
“substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce”120 category as one of the 
basic concepts permitting congressional regulation. However, Justice Scalia 
viewed the category as misleading. He argued that rules governing activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce, but are not themselves part of 
interstate commerce, cannot derive their authority from the Commerce 
Clause.121 Rather, once Congress goes beyond regulation of commercial 
activities, it is deriving its power from the Necessary and Proper Clause.122 
Thus, in a given case, we might find Congress devising rules either for the 
governance of commerce or to facilitate it by eliminating obstructions.123 
Justice Scalia derived support for this distinction from Lopez and Morrison 
 
 
115 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).  
116 Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).  
117 See, e.g., Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209–11. 
118 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
119 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
120 E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000).  
121 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215–16 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215–16. 
123 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216. 
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themselves.124 However, he read the cases as imposing a further distinction. 
If the conduct in question is economic, Congress may regulate it if that 
conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.125 On the other hand, 
Congress may regulate “noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.”126 
At least two reservations about Justice Scalia’s general doctrinal 
framework should be noted. In drawing the line between regulation of 
economic and noneconomic activity,127 he appears to be saying that the latter 
cannot be sustained under any notion of “substantial effects.” Rather, the 
question is whether the noneconomic activity “undercut[s]”128 the regulatory 
scheme. As later discussion of the Hobbs Act129 will show, there may well be 
instances of noneconomic activity with a substantial effect on commerce that 
do not harm a regulatory scheme. It is possible to draw such distinctions too 
finely. Second, applying a distinction between substantial effect and 
undercutting regulation is hard to do in the context of cases like Wickard and 
Raich. The commodities in question—wheat and marijuana—are closely 
related to the interstate market and potentially part of it. Moreover, the 
“regulation” is in the form of a ban. Does it make more sense to say that Ms. 
Raich was potentially a market participant, and thus could be regulated as 
part of it, or that somehow her consumption undercut the broader federal 
regulation? Although Justice Scalia attempted to draw the line sharply 
between these two forms of legislation, his application of it to the facts of the 
case blurred the issue. He followed closely Justice Stevens in explaining that 
marijuana is a fungible commodity and that the drugs in possession of 
individuals like Raich could easily find their way into the market.130 
Nonetheless, his summation of his views stated that “Congress could 




125 See id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995); United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)). 
126 Id. at 2217. As an illustration, Justice Scalia cited United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941), in which Congress both excluded from commerce goods that were made 
in violation of federal standards, and also required employers to keep records to 
demonstrate compliance. The first part of the scheme could be viewed as an example of 
regulating an economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, while 
the record-keeping requirement is an example of a noneconomic activity regulated under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to further the aims of the economic regulation. Raich, 
125 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
127 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005). 
128 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
129 See infra notes 333–34, 373–90. 
130 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219. 
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interstate market ‘could be undercut’ if those activities were excepted from 
its general scheme of regulation.”131  
Justice Scalia did sound some New Federalism themes absent from the 
majority opinion. He paid homage to “the line between ‘what is truly national 
and what is truly local.’”132 He also affirmed not only the validity of Lopez 
and Morrison but also the nonattenuation principle expressed therein.133 
However, he found no inconsistency with these cases. Upholding the 
regulation of intrastate activity in Raich was permissible because Congress 
had set in place a valid scheme of regulating interstate activity.134 Whether 
such a scheme existed at all was the central issue on which the Court divided 
in Lopez and Morrison.135 Once such a scheme is in place, as in the case of 
the CSA, Lopez and Morrison do not prevent regulation of intrastate 
noneconomic activity to protect it. Like Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia gave 
no weight to the existence of a contrary state statutory approach, despite the 
fact that the area was one “typically left to state regulation.”136 Thus, on the 




131 Id. at 2220 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). The 
differences between the two approaches seem slight, despite Justice Scalia’s emphasis on 
interference with federal regulation and Justices Stevens’s emphasis on activities that can 
be aggregated to produce a substantial effect on commerce. He too stresses the risk of a 
gap that would “undercut” or “frustrate” the regulatory scheme, as well as the risk of a 
“gaping hole in the CSA.” Id. at 2206, 2207, 2209 (majority opinion). Both focus on the 
fact that the marijuana might enter the interstate market—in Justice Scalia’s words, 
“marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more than an 
instant from the interstate market.” Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring). This is a result that 
Congress can forbid as part of the CSA. The drug’s entrance into the market would 
certainly have an effect on that market. The presence of more drugs for law enforcement 
to deal with, as well as the difficulty of distinguishing between intrastate and interstate 
marijuana, could also interfere with the federal regulatory goal of interdicting marijuana 
by making that goal harder to accomplish. It may be that stating the problem as one of 
what is necessary and proper leads to a focus on undercutting a regulation, while viewing 
the market as a single entity leads to a focus on the need to regulate all facets of it.  
132 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68); see also 
id. at 2216. 
133 Id. at 2216–17. 
134 Id. 2219–20. 
135 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
136 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005). 
137 As to the validity of the regulation, Justice Scalia did seem to require that the 
regulation be reasonable, as opposed to requiring a mere rational basis. Id.  
2005] NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH  
 
965
                                                                                                                  
D. Justice O’Connor’s Dissent—New Federalism Abandoned? 
Justice O’Connor (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) authored a strong 
dissent138 that treated the decision as a betrayal of the New Federalism, 
particularly insofar as that general approach’s precepts were embodied in 
Lopez and Morrison. Her opinion contains many of the formulations that 
have been integral portions of the Court’s recent decisions arguing for a 
strengthened state role. She began by stating that “[w]e enforce the ‘outer 
limits’ of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake, 
but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal 
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental 
to our federalist system of government.”139 She also made reference to “dual 
sovereignty,”140 the dangers of a “federal police power,”141 and the historic 
and special role of the states in “areas of criminal law and social policy.”142 
She placed special emphasis on the role of the states as “laboratories” for 
innovative policies,143 one of the classic and most frequently invoked 
arguments for a vigorous federalism.144 Indeed, the importance of the state 
role as laboratories is present in both the first and last paragraphs of her 
opinion, and plays a role in her doctrinal argument that the content of state 
law carries substantial weight in a case like Raich, which “involves the 
interplay of federal and state regulation . . . .”145
However, the heart of her analysis was devoted to Lopez and Morrison 
and her view that they are “materially indistinguishable”146 from Raich, and 
“irreconcilable” with the Court’s decision.147 Although stopping short of the 
widespread notion in courts of appeals that Lopez or Morrison contained a 
 
 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 2224. She also invoked “state autonomy.” Id. 
141 Id. at 2225. 
142 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005). 
143 Id. at 2221. 
144 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated 
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 776–77; John O. 
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of 
Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 519 (2002). Calabresi points to “an incentive for 
state governments to experiment and improve.” Calabresi, supra, at 777. The benefits are 
twofold: potentially better services in individual states and models for other states to 
follow. Id. 
145 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224. 
146 Id. at 2222. 
147 Id. at 2221. 
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four-part “test,” she stated that the former case “turned on”148 four 
considerations. The first was that “substantial effects” cases have generally 
upheld regulation of economic activity that affected interstate commerce, but 
that the criminal statute in Lopez had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any 
sort of economic enterprise.”149 The case also noted the lack of a 
jurisdictional element, and the lack of legislative findings.150 Finally, Lopez 
contained the nonattenuation principle,151 specifically, rejection of the 
argument “that firearm possession in school zones could result in violent 
crime, which, in turn, could adversely affect the national economy.”152 
The key to her analysis was whether the conduct to be considered was 
that of the plaintiffs, or the entire field regulated by the CSA.153 She 
expressed great concern that the Court was encouraging Congress to use 
general statutes to mask regulation of intrastate activity.154 Thus, Lopez had 
been reduced to “nothing more than a drafting guide.”155 She argued that in 
the case of the statute at issue in Lopez, Congress might as easily have 
described the crime as “transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the 
nation,”156 thus encompassing a broad range of activities, some of which 
would have the necessary substantial effect, and which would include the 
possession of guns in school zones. 
She addressed the appropriateness of an as-applied challenge, noted the 
Court’s expressed preference for such challenges, and proceeded to consider 
the definition of the relevant class.157 For her, state law played a role both in 
defining the relevant class and in giving it a presumptive status of validity. In 
general, Justice O’Connor argued that situations like Raich call for a 
balancing test that “depends on the regulatory scheme at issue and the 
federalism concerns implicated.”158 Because of the high deference that 
should be accorded to state actions in areas of criminal and social policy, the 
burden lies with the federal government to justify its regulation in such 
 
 
148 Id.; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
149 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)); see id. at 2222 (stating that 
the Court relied on the same four considerations in Morrison).  
150 Id. at 2221–22. 
151 See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–12. 
152 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222. 
153 Id. at 2222–23. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 2223. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 2223–24 (2005). 
158 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
2005] NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH  
 
967
                                                                                                                  
situations.159 For Justice O’Connor, “a concern for dual sovereignty requires 
that Congress’[s] excursion into the traditional domain of States be 
justified.”160 After noting the role of state law in permitting medical use, she 
defined the class as individuals engaged in “the personal cultivation, 
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.”161 She expressed 
strong doubt that such activity could be labeled as economic or 
commercial.162 For Justice O’Connor, examining whether regulating 
intrastate activity somehow furthered the interstate scheme of the CSA was 
subject to the same burden on the part of the federal government, even if the 
Necessary and Proper Clause came into play.163 Here again, principles of 
state sovereignty played an important role in a negative answer. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion is noteworthy for the extent to which she 
was willing to have the Court engage in judicial consideration of the issue of 
the intrastate dimensions of marijuana. She distinguished Wickard on the 
grounds that it contained an extensive record developed in the litigation 
itself.164 As for intrastate possession under the CSA, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that Congress had not made relevant findings, in particular, 
findings that dealt with marijuana.165 She viewed the “findings” in the CSA 
that dealt with local manifestations of drug-related issues as nothing more 
than “declarations.”166 She left open the possibility that the government 
could make an argument that the intrastate activities had an effect on or 
constituted an interference with the federal statute, but found that in the 
actual litigation the presumption created by state action had not been 
overcome.167
Justice O’Connor is certainly right in emphasizing the problems that 
arise in as-applied challenges to statutes that regulate a concededly interstate 
problem, such as the drug market. However, it is unrealistic to assume that 
Congress would pass broad statutes primarily for the purpose of reaching a 
narrow and discrete set of intrastate activities. For example, it is highly 
unlikely that Congress would pass a statute prohibiting “transfer or 
 
 
159 Id. at 2226. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 2224. 
162 Id. at 2225. 
163 Id. at 2226. 
164 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2227 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She 
also distinguished it on the ground that the relevant statute had exempted some small 
producers. Id. at 2225.  
165 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2227–28. 
166 Id. at 2227. 
167 Id. 
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possession of a firearm anywhere in the nation” in order to get at guns in 
school zones. The political difficulties that are obvious in trying to pass any 
such broad statute inevitably lead toward attempts at the narrow one, 
attempts of the sort foiled in Lopez.168 National power would be expanded 
greatly if the Court examined intrastate effects without reference to a general 
statute, or did not even require the existence of one. Again, neither step 
seems likely, although Justice O’Connor is right in noting the analytical 
difficulties present.169 The reviewing court has to be mindful at all times of 
the relationship between the challenging class and the broadly regulated area. 
On the more fundamental issue of the consistency of Raich with Lopez 
and Morrison, Justice O’Connor ignored the difference in statutory context 
that she elsewhere discussed at length.170 Those cases were “on their face” 
challenges to statutes that the Court held beyond Congress’s power to enact 
at all. The majority in each case found no substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.171 In Raich, on the other hand, there was a valid regulation of 
commerce.172 Nothing in Lopez or Morrison casts doubt on the CSA. The 
question in Raich was how to analyze the as-applied challenge in light of the 
larger statute. It is difficult to excise the intrastate conduct and attempt to 
measure its effect on commerce separately from the effect of the entire 
regulated class. Markets, including potential parts thereof, may not lend 
themselves to disaggregation for legal analysis. Placing the burden of 
justification on the federal government, Justice O’Connor appeared to answer 
the substantial effects question173 with insufficient concern for the CSA and 
its goal of banning interstate trafficking in marijuana. It seems, as the 
majority argued, a serious misreading of Lopez and Morrison to approach 
valid class-of-activity statutes in this manner.174  
Particularly problematic is the role of state law. There is no mention in 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion of the Supremacy Clause. Her analysis seems to 
be that congressional and state statutes are arrayed against each other on a 
playing field which varies, in terms of relative advantage, with the nature of 
the subject matter and the degree to which the subject matter looks more 
 
 
168 See id. at 2210 n.34 (majority opinion). 
169 She referred to “the problem endemic to the Court’s opinion—the shift in focus 
from the activity at issue in this case to the entirety of what the CSA regulates.” Id. at 
2224.  
170 Id. at 2221–24. 
171 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
172 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2204 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 2225–26. 
174 Id.at 2209–11 (majority opinion). 
2005] NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH  
 
969
                                                                                                                  
“state” or more “federal.” One might have reservations about giving this 
much weight to any state law when a conflict with federal law is present. 
These reservations ought to extend to the possibility of a judicial examination 
of whether the operation of the state law seals off the relevant class from the 
interstate market and, thereby, makes the federal law unnecessary as to that 
class. More fundamental, however, is the question of whether the decision 
that the federal statute is valid totally precludes any inquiries along these 
lines given the basic principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause. 
E. Justice Thomas and the Role of State Law Within Necessary and 
Proper Analysis 
Like Justice O’Connor, Justice Thomas sounded many New Federalism 
themes, in particular, the danger that the federal government could become 
“no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.”175 After concluding that 
plaintiffs’ conduct did not represent interstate commerce under either his 
definition or that of the majority,176 he examined what he regarded as the 
more difficult question of whether regulation of their intrastate conduct 
might still be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.177 
Surprisingly, he concluded that, looked at on its face, the intrastate ban on 
cultivation, possession, and distribution could be “plainly adapted to stopping 
the interstate flow of marijuana.”178 In this respect, he appeared to accept the 
majority’s reasoning about marijuana’s potential entry into the market, thus 
making it more difficult to regulate. However, for Justice Thomas, the fact 
that the plaintiffs challenged the CSA as applied to their conduct, instead of 
on its face, was determinative.179
 He saw state law as playing a crucial role in determining the class whose 
challenge was before the Court: “local growers and users of state-authorized, 
medical marijuana.”180 He also devoted considerable attention to the “strict[] 
controls”181 that California placed upon such users and concluded that the 
state statutory scheme probably demonstrated that it was not “necessary” for 
 
 
175 Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
176 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229–30. Justice Thomas expounded on his definition of 
commerce in his separate Lopez opinion. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585–87 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
177 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230–34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. at 2231. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 2231 (emphasis added). 
181 Id. at 2232 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the federal government to override it in order to preserve effective regulation 
of the interstate marijuana traffic.182  
Even if necessary, the federal scheme—reaching so deeply into state-
regulated intrastate matters—would not be “proper,”183 according to Justice 
Thomas. In applying the term proper, Justice Thomas focused on the role of 
federal law in expanding the powers of Congress to the point of giving it “a 
general ‘police power’ over the Nation.”184 In particular, he expressed grave 
concern over the encroachment on states’ traditional police powers in the 
areas of criminal law, health, safety, and welfare, and explicitly denied 
Congress any power to use its “incidental authority to subvert basic 
principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.”185 Justice Thomas, like 
Justice Scalia, also attacked the “substantial effects test,” albeit for different 
reasons. He argued that it is too malleable. It allows definition of the class at 
such a high level of generality—for example, any intrastate possession—that 
the test imposes no limits on congressional authority.186 He also took issue 
with the extension of federal power to intrastate noneconomic activity as 
inconsistent with recent precedent.187 He invoked the nonattenuation 
principle against the majority, arguing that it was allowing the Commerce 
Clause to “reach the entire web of human activity,” based on the 
interconnectedness of the various aspects of the economic activity that 
Congress might wish to reach.188 The result of such extensive federalization 
is to “strip” the states of their authority over conduct such as that in Raich, 
since the operation of federal law would prevent state law from having any 
say, at least a contrary one.189
In the course of this discussion of his differences with the majority, 
Justice Thomas conceded the validity of traditional class-of-activities 
analysis and even cited the famous language from Maryland v. Wirtz to the 
effect that when a valid class is in existence, individual, de minimis instances 
cannot be excised.190 However, he also expressed a preference for as-applied 
 
 
182 Id. at 2233. 
183 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2233 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 2234. 
186 Id. at 2235–37. 
187 Id. at 2235–36 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)).  
188 Id. at 2236. 
189 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236–37 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 2237 (“One searches the Court’s opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect 
of American life is reserved to the States.”). 
190 Id. at 2237. 
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challenges.191 In any such challenge, the nature of the class and the manner 
in which it is defined are key. Justice Thomas emphasized, once again, the 
special characteristics of these plaintiffs and their purported class.192 As with 
Justice O’Connor, state law played the roles of demarcation of the specific 
subclass, attempting a potentially important experiment in the difficult, 
sometimes intractable, field of drug regulation,193 and removing a quantity of 
marijuana from any possible interstate uses. By focusing on the issue of state 
law in the way that they did, the inevitable question about the Raich dissents 
(and the Ninth Circuit majority) is whether the dissenters wished to extend 
the New Federalism beyond a point which it had previously reached, with 
grave implications for national authority. 
III. RAICH AND THE NEW FEDERALISM 
A. Raich as a Setback 
There are a number of reasons why Raich might be seen as a setback for 
the New Federalism. Perhaps most important is its failure to grant Lopez (and 
Morrison) any generative force. Lopez is treated with respect, as establishing 
the parameters for considering the general validity of a federal statute under 
the substantial effects prong of regulations of commerce.194 But the analysis 
may seem Lopez-Lite in the sense that Lopez’s ramifications do not extend 
beyond congressional attempts to define a problem as so sufficiently related 
to commerce that the federal government has power to deal with it. Raich 
presented the proverbial next question of how to deal with the intrastate 
dimensions of an admittedly national problem subject to valid federal 
regulation. From the point of view of a New Federalism advocate, cases such 
as Lopez and Raich might be seen as presenting two issues that are 
analytically close: (1) does the national government have the power to deal 
with a problem at all; and, (2) if it does, how far does its power reach into the 
intrastate manifestations of the problem? For the New Federalist, the second 
question is just as important as the first. 
I think that the New Federalist critique of Raich has to be taken 
seriously. After all, of the twelve appellate judges who passed on the case, 
 
 
191 Id. at 2238. 
192 Id. at 2237 (“If medical marijuana patients like . . . Raich largely stand outside 
the interstate drug market, then courts must excise them from the CSA’s coverage.”). 
193 Id. at 2232, 2238–39.  
194 Id. at 2209–10 (majority opinion). 
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five thought that the CSA was invalid as applied.195 Granted, the Raich 
context is different from that of Lopez and Morrison, but these judges found 
in the latter cases principles applicable to the former. Should Justice Stevens 
have drawn the economic/commercial line differently, excluding the small-
scale intrastate activity in question? Justice O’Connor criticized him for 
analytical confusion: using the admittedly commercial nature of the general 
statute as an excuse for jumping to all intrastate manifestations of marijuana 
consumption and production as covered by the CSA’s wide net.196 However, 
two important points need to be made in defense of Justice Stevens. The first 
is that Lopez reaffirmed the notion of a class-of-activities statute from which, 
once the statute was held valid, “trivial” excisions should not be made.197 
The second is that Lopez reaffirmed Wickard as well, and Justice Stevens 
engaged in a plausible application of that case and its analysis. Like the 
wheat in Wickard, “purely intrastate”198 marijuana “overhangs”199 the 
market, and, if it entered the market, would have a substantial effect. Perhaps 
Justice Stevens can be faulted by defenders of Lopez for applying rational 
basis analysis so as not to force Congress to justify its actions more fully.200 
This would be a possible departure, at least from the spirit of Lopez, which 
suggested a more thorough judicial undertaking. However, it remains the 
case that Lopez treated Wickard’s analysis of intrastate problems as good 
law.201 If Lopez lacks generative force, the fault may well lie in the case 
itself, a point made by commentators who have seen it more as a necessary 
 
 
195 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas, of the Supreme 
Court; and the two judges in the majority on the Ninth Circuit. 
196 Justice O’Connor stated:  
Putting to one side the problem endemic to the Court’s opinion—the shift in focus 
from the activity at issue in this case to the entirety of what the CSA regulates, 
(depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as 
commercial)—the Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity 
into federal regulatory reach.  
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
197 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 
392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)). 
198 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206. 
199 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). 
200 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
201 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. 
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correction than as a “revolution” in federal-state relations and American 
constitutional law.202
Another reason Raich might be regarded as a setback for the New 
Federalism is the Court’s dismissal of any role for state law. California’s 
Compassionate Use Act would, after all, have created the class of activities 
to be analyzed: “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and 
use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician 
and in accordance with state law.”203 The majority viewed state law as 
irrelevant once federal power was found. The dissenters would have 
accorded it an importance far beyond anything suggested in Lopez. 
Essentially, they adopted the position of the Ninth Circuit, which concluded 
that state law itself rendered inoperative an otherwise valid federal statute.204 
California law bestowed the legitimacy of medical use on designated 
individuals,205 and thereby removed those individuals from the regulatory 
regime of the CSA. In other words, state law played the key role in 
identifying and excising a subclass. 
Justice Stevens surely was correct in invoking concepts of federal 
supremacy to negate the notion of any such role for state law. If federal law 
regulating private conduct is valid, the notion that state law purporting to 
regulate that same conduct in a diametrically opposed way could insulate it 
from the federal regime flies in the face of the scheme established by the 
Supremacy Clause.206 Moreover, the uniformity of federal law would also be 
 
 
202 Massey, supra note 2, at 479 (“The Court tinkered with existing doctrine rather 
than challenging its foundations.”). One commentator predicted that Lopez would not 
have a significant effect on federal criminal law because of its approval of the 
aggregation principle and jurisdictional elements. Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting 
United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 61, 107 (1997). 
203 This is the class as defined by the court of appeals. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 
1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 
S. Ct. 2195 (2005). Justice O’Connor approved of this definition. See Gonzales v. Raich, 
125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting).  
204 State law not only played a key role in defining the class. The Ninth Circuit, in 
weighing the public interest factors relevant to injunctive relief, stated that “[t]he public 
interest of the state of California and its voters in the viability of the Compassionate Use 
Act also weighs against the appellees’ concerns.” Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235. 
205 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
206 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .”); see 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213 (2005) (“[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart 
the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress”) (quoting Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (alternation in original)). In response to Justice 
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seriously undermined. What would happen in states with no compassionate 
use scheme? No intrastate subclass of state-law-authorized medical users 
could be distinguished, even if there were users exactly like the Raich 
plaintiffs. Thus, the general class-of-activities analysis of cases like 
Maryland v. Wirtz207 and Perez v. United States208 would presumably 
prevail.  
However, not all cases will be this clear. What if state law differed 
substantially from federal law in some other way? What would happen in a 
state where recreational, personal use of marijuana is quasi-legal in that it is 
subject to minor civil penalties only? Should courts excise a subclass of 
“noncriminal, recreational, personal, intrastate users of marijuana” who 
cannot be prosecuted by the federal government under the CSA? Once again, 
it would be state law that determined whether federal prosecutions could 
proceed. In states without any such statutes, such subclasses would not exist 
and the prosecutions could proceed. As the hypothetical suggests, 
fundamental precepts of uniformity and supremacy argue against any such 
result. Federal law should be more than the default position. 
The fact that the Raich Court did not go down this road is strong 
evidence that a substantial, perhaps radical, extension of the New Federalism 
did not occur. There are other aspects of Raich that lead to the same 
conclusion. One of the most important aspects of the New Federalism, 
potentially present in Raich, is the concept of states serving as 
laboratories.209 Advocates of state power often cite as an advantage of 
federalism the ability of states to experiment with differing solutions to social 
problems.210 These solutions might then be adopted by other states or by the 
 
Thomas, Justice Stevens stated that “his rationale seemingly would require Congress to 
cede its constitutional power to regulate commerce whenever a State opts to exercise its 
‘traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens.’” Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213 n.38. 
207 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
208 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
209 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2229 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting) 
(“[T]he federalism principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that 
room for experiment be protected in this case.”); see also id. at 2239 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Our federalist system, properly understood, allows California and a growing 
number of other States to decide for themselves how to safeguard the health and welfare 
of their citizens.”). 
210 Id. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of federalism’s chief virtues, of 
course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”) (quoting New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see Calabresi, 
supra note 144, at 777 (describing Brandeis’ view as creating “an incentive for state 
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federal government. Justice O’Connor criticized the majority sharply for 
“extinguish[ing]” any such laboratory role in Raich.211 However, the 
laboratory analogy seems best applied to situations in which no government 
has formulated a solution, or, at least, in which the legal landscape leaves 
wide room to maneuver. This is hardly the case with drugs. The national 
government has established a policy that stands until the national government 
is convinced to change it. In a variant on the “political safeguards of 
federalism”212 argument, Justice Stevens argued that California and like-
minded states could use the political process to achieve acceptance for their 
results.213 Given the size of California’s congressional delegation, this is 
hardly a fanciful contention. However, striking down federal statutes so that 
the “laboratories” are free to experiment would be a substantial expansion of 
the judicial role in federalism disputes. It would go well beyond Justice 
Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence and its invocation of the laboratory role. 
Beyond the laboratory argument of providing useful examples for other 
jurisdictions lies a more fundamental justification for federalism: the 
possibility, and desirability, that states will be different. As Professor 
Calabresi puts it,  
The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and 
preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly with 
geography, and that social utility can be maximized if governmental units 
are small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be adapted to 
local conditions, something the national government, with its uniform 
lawmaking power, is largely unable to do.214
 In a relevant example, Professors Nelson and Pushaw contend that “if 
51% of Americans believe that drug use should be dealt with through harsh 
criminal sanctions, and 49% think it should be addressed through education 
and rehabilitation, it is better that state laws reflect that diversity (however 
unevenly) than to impose one view (e.g., strict criminalization) 
 
governments to experiment and improve”). But cf. Gey, supra note 2, at 1671 (expressing 
doubt about the factual premise of the laboratory theory). 
211 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221; see id. at 2229 (Raich “stifles an express choice by 
some States, concerned for the lives and liberties of their people, to regulate medical 
marijuana differently.”). 
212 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543 (1954). The core of Professor Wechsler’s thesis is that the states are adequately 
represented in Congress and can rely on it to protect federalism interests. Judicial 
intervention for this purpose is not necessary. Id. at 558–59. 
213 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213–14. 
214 Calabresi, supra note 144, at 775. 
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nationwide.”215 The criminal law in general is a prime example of the 
“cultural federalism” that the New Federalism seeks to enhance.216 However, 
as long as a majority favors criminal sanctions in the drug context, it seems 
essential to achieve them through federal law. The problem has substantial 
interstate and international dimensions. Moreover, federal criminal 
legislation is closely tied to national regulation of drugs.  
Not only did the Court refuse to extend the New Federalism; it also 
ignored its rhetoric. In this respect, it is helpful to consider the role that key 
phrases of the New Federalism vocabulary played in Raich. The majority and 
concurring opinions in Lopez, the majority opinion in Morrison, and the 
dissents in Raich are replete with phrases that have come, in many ways, to 
symbolize the New Federalism. These include: the notion of spheres of state 
autonomy,217 state sovereignty,218 the lack of a national police power,219 the 
special state role in criminal law,220 the role of enumerated federal powers as 
a guarantee of state power,221 and dual federalism.222 These are not only 
phrases with important symbolic content. They point toward a methodology 
for evaluating federal statutes. This methodology would treat any “incursion” 
on federalism values as playing a role in assessing the validity of the federal 
law. In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy stated that “the 
statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an 
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our intervention is 
 
 
215 Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 116–17 (1999). Professors Nelson and 
Pushaw accept the federal drug laws in general, but would exempt donative transfers and 
mere possession without intent to sell. Id. at 137–38; see infra note 300 (discussing their 
test for “commerce” and its implications for the aggregation principle).  
216 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 113. 
217 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
218 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
219 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618–
19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion). 
220 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion). 
221 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619; 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (majority opinion). 
222 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 608; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
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required.”223 For Justice Kennedy, if Congress attempts to extend the 
commerce power too far, “then at the least we must inquire whether the 
exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state 
concern.”224 In Morrison, the majority took a step further towards such a 
mode of analysis. After stating that “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local,”225 Chief Justice 
Renquist cited the criminal law as a prime example.226 It is possible that his 
language, which came in the Commerce Clause context, is only directed at 
determining whether a particular activity is “commerce” or “interstate 
commerce.” However, the language is perhaps more a step toward attempting 
to identify spheres of state authority that the national government cannot 
reach regardless of whether it has prima facie power.227
In Raich, however, it is only in the dissents that this analysis plays a 
substantial role. Justice O’Connor stated that “because fundamental structural 
concerns about dual sovereignty animate our Commerce Clause cases, it is 
relevant that this case involves the interplay of federal and state regulation in 
areas of criminal law and social policy in which ‘States lay claim by right of 
history and expertise.’”228 She also declared that “a concern for dual 
sovereignty requires that Congress’[s] excursion into the traditional domain 
of States be justified.”229 Justice Thomas, in his analysis of whether the CSA, 
in its application to the Raich facts, was “proper,” used similar language.230
One of the surprising aspects of Raich is that neither the majority 
opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, nor the concurrence authored by Justice 
Scalia, made serious reference to these concepts and their implications for 
national power. Justice Stevens, who had dissented in Lopez and described 
the decision as “radical,”231 portrayed the Commerce Clause as the central 
 
 
223 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
224 Id. 
225 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000). 
226 Id. at 619. 
227 See Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 394 n.32 
(2003) (criticizing the notion of criminal law as a separate sphere and citing numerous 
critiques of the sphere approach). 
228 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting) 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice O’Connor also cited 
to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez and her earlier dissenting opinion in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 586 (1985) (“‘[s]tate 
autonomy is a relevant factor in assessing the means by which Congress exercises its 
powers’ under the Commerce Clause”) (alteration in original).  
229 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
231 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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component of American federalism, while ignoring the New Federalism 
rhetoric completely.232 Justice Scalia did quote from Lopez about the danger 
of letting the Clause obliterate the line between “what is truly national and 
what is truly local,”233 but found no such danger in Raich. Justice Stevens’ 
other reference to federalism problems is his invocation of the Supremacy 
Clause in rejecting the notion that state law could affect the validity of 
federal law.234 Obviously, both the majority and Justice Scalia realized that 
the case was about federalism. These justices simply did not think that 
anything the Court has said recently on the subject required considering a 
departure from the Wickard-based analysis that plays such a key role in their 
opinions. The standard phrases that accompany New Federalism analysis are 
conspicuous in their absence, in particular, the notion that federal criminal 
statutes present special problems because they touch on an area of traditional 
state concern.  
The prominent role of Wickard will be particularly galling to advocates 
of the New Federalism. Lopez had described that case as representing the 
outer limits of the Court’s tolerant view of the Commerce Clause and the 
reach of legislation based on it.235 Conservatives have long viewed Wickard 
with suspicion,236 particularly because of the possibilities it opens of broad 
federal regulation of intrastate activity, even when that activity seems totally 
removed and separate from any interstate market. A logical next step for 
New Federalists would be to call for the Court to overrule or substantially 
limit Wickard. In their landmark analysis of Commerce Clause doctrine, 
Professors Nelson and Pushaw express sympathy for conservative arguments 
that would limit the role of aggregation.237 However, they appear to accept 
 
 
232 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205. 
233 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2216 (“what is [truly] national 
and what is [truly] local”). 
234 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212–13 n.38 (2005) (majority opinion). 
235 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  
236 E.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J., 
dissenting); cf. Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 12–13, Raich v. Ashcroft 352 F.3d 1222 (2003) (No. 03-1454) 
(explaining that because virtually any conceivable activity in the aggregate affects 
interstate commerce, Wickard’s aggregation analysis has the potential to remove all limits 
on Congress’s authority). Professor McGinnis has stated that “[p]erhaps the ultimate 
indignity that federalism suffered in [the New Deal] period was Wickard v. Filburn.” 
McGinnis, supra note 144, at 511. See Calabresi, supra note 144, at 804 (stating that 
there was “no reason [in Lopez] for the Court’s extreme show of respect for atrocities 
such as Wickard”); see also Massey, supra note 2, at 476–79 (discussing and criticizing 
Wickard’s aggregation principle). 
237 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 111 n.518. 
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Wickard “because in our integrated national economy, almost any 
commercial activity might reasonably be viewed as affecting interstate 
commerce.”238 Their overall solution is for the Court to adopt a more limited 
view of the Commerce Clause in general.239 Raich does not seem a step in 
that direction, despite its emphasis on the economic/commercial line. 
The question naturally arises whether Raich will have generative force. 
A recent pornography case suggests an affirmative answer.240 As discussed 
below,241 there has been ongoing disagreement among the courts of appeals 
about the federal government’s use of anti-pornography statutes to reach 
“personal” pornography, that is, items generated by individuals with no 
apparent connection to any market. In United States v. Smith,242 the lower 
court had found such pornography beyond the reach of federal regulatory 
power. Three weeks after Raich, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, directing the Court of Appeals 
to reconsider its decision in light of Raich.243 This remand for 
reconsideration in light of Raich does not stand alone.244 Thus, the case 
seems to have generative force, a result that will give advocates of the New 
Federalism considerable cause for concern.  
In sum, Raich refused to build upon Lopez and extend it to intrastate 
problems, relied on Wickard, denied state law any role in challenges to 
federal law of the sort presented, and virtually ignored the rhetoric of the 
New Federalism, let alone the possibility that this rhetoric signaled a new 




239 Their test is as follows: “Congress must (1) regulate ‘commerce,’ (2) that 
implicates commerce in more than one state.” Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). Recall that 
even Justice Thomas, dissenting in Raich, accepted the Wickard rationale:  
On its face, a ban on intrastate cultivation, possession and distribution of 
marijuana may be plainly adapted to stopping the interstate flow of marijuana. 
Unregulated local growers and users could swell both the supply and the demand 
sides of the interstate marijuana market, making the market more difficult to 
regulate. 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
240 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated 125 S. Ct. 2938 
(2005). 
241 See infra notes 398–455. 
242 Smith, 402 F.3d at 1328. 
243 United States v. Smith, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005). 
244 Id.; United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 
S. Ct. 321 (2005); Klingler v. Director Dept. Rev., 366 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005). 
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federal criminal statutes as presenting special problems. In addition, as the 
various remands of lower courts of appeals decisions for reconsideration in 
light of Raich show, it is a precedent to be reckoned with. Taken together, all 
of this sounds like a serious setback for the New Federalism.  
B. The New Federalism Lives 
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the New Federalism 
concept, as embodied in Lopez and Morrison, retains its validity. Raich can 
be seen more as a refusal to extend it than an abandonment. Let us first 
consider the role of Lopez and Morrison in Raich itself. After all, if Lopez 
and Morrison are alive and well, then the New Federalism retains 
considerable force in constitutional analysis. All four opinions in Raich 
treated Lopez and Morrison as the major recent cases to guide analysis in 
Commerce Clause challenges. I will focus here on the opinions of Justices 
Stevens and Scalia. Justice Stevens began his analysis with a citation to 
Lopez in a manner that puts that case forward as the definitive recent 
guide.245 It is true that he turned to Wickard as the Commerce Clause 
precedent most directly on point.246 However, he later devoted a key part of 
the majority opinion to rebutting plaintiffs’ attempts to extend Lopez and 
Morrison to the situation in Raich.247 Justice Stevens first noted the 
important difference in the form of the challenge present before the Court in 
Raich248 as opposed to that in Lopez and Morrison. In the latter two cases, 
the issue was whether Congress had the power to regulate the conduct at 
all.249 Raich presented the different question of how far into potential 
subclasses of intrastate conduct a valid general regulatory statute reaches.250 
Justice Stevens viewed as important a second difference in the statutory 
context. Lopez had involved “a brief, single-subject statute.”251 It was not a 
general regulation of economic activity. Therefore, the situation was not 
present in which a general statute can be “undercut” by failure to reach 
specific intrastate examples of the conduct in question.252 By contrast, the 
CSA is a broad-scale statute, covering a wide range of drugs and possible 
 
 
245 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); see id. at nn.24, 26, 27 (citing 
Lopez). 
246 Id. at 2206–08. 
247 Id. at 2209–11. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 2209. 
251 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005). 
252 See, e.g., id. at 2216–17 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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uses. Thus, the doctrine of intrastate undercutting could come into play. The 
most important distinction between the CSA and the statutes at issue in 
Lopez and Morrison was, for Justice Stevens, that those two statutes were 
unconstitutional because they “did not regulate economic activity.”253 By 
contrast, he presented the CSA as regulating “quintessentially economic”254 
activities, and concluded that “[b]ecause the CSA is a statute that directly 
regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no 
doubt on its constitutionality.”255  
Lopez and Morrison, especially the former, play a central role in Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion. He noted both that they recognize the 
“expansive scope”256 of congressional authority under the general rubric of 
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and also that they 
recognize the notion of limits on congressional power.257 As noted earlier, 
much of his analysis focused on the possibility of what Lopez referred to as 
the existence of “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated.”258 Again drawing on Lopez, he made it clear that 
such a regulation can extend to noneconomic activity. He agreed with Justice 
Stevens on the importance of the difference in statutory context between 
Raich, on the one hand, and Lopez and Morrison on the other: “neither case 
involved the power of Congress to exert control over intrastate activities in 
connection with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation.”259 As did 
Justice Stevens, he saw the economic/commercial line as at the heart of the 
holding of invalidity of the federal statutes in Lopez and Morrison: “The 
pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”260  
Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis that Justice Stevens placed on 
the economic/commercial line for evaluating the validity of federal 
legislation under the third prong of standard Commerce Clause analysis: “the 
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”261 
He emphasized the noneconomic nature of the statutes at issue in Lopez and 
 
 
253 Id. at 2210. 
254 Id. at 2211. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
257 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
258 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
259 Id. at 2218. 
260 Id. at 2216 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (alteration in original)). 
261 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205. 
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Morrison as both the reason for their invalidity and the central distinction 
from the statute in Raich.262 It is true that his analysis sometimes blurs the 
line between regulating commerce and preventing the undercutting of 
regulation,263 but the central point holds: federal statutes that did not directly 
regulate economic/commercial activity were struck down. The very reason 
for proceeding with the further analysis in Raich was that the CSA did 
regulate such activity. Yet the economic/commercial line necessarily 
involves the Court in the categorical, formalistic inquiries for which Lopez 
and Morrison had been so sharply criticized.264 Dissenting in the latter case, 
Justice Souter decried “formalistically contrived confines of commerce 
power.”265 With respect to Morrison itself, he castigated the majority in the 
following terms: 
[T]oday’s decision can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior 
mistakes. Its revival of a distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial conduct is at odds with Wickard, which repudiated that 
analysis, and the enquiry into commercial purpose, first intimated by the 
Lopez concurrence, is cousin to the intent-based analysis employed in 
Hammer but rejected for Commerce Clause purposes in Heart of Atlanta 
and Darby.266
From a New Federalist perspective, the line presents the possibility of 
striking down legislation that exceeds an important enumerated power, thus 
protecting state authority. The economic/commercial line can also come into 
play in statutory interpretation, as established by Jones v. United States267 in 
which the Court utilized Lopez and Morrison to construe a federal arson 
statute narrowly.268 The analysis could also lead to a finding of no federal 
power in cases which involve a statute that contains a jurisdictional element 
requiring an effect on commerce.269 Thus, the preservation and central role in 
 
 
262 See generally Id. at 2195 (majority opinion). 
263 The same criticism can be made of Justice Scalia’s analysis. 
264 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 638–39 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
265 Id. at 642. This was a principal cause of the judicial crisis of the New Deal 
period.  
266 Id. at 643 (citations omitted). 
267 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000); see George D. Brown, 
Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1009–13 (2001). 
268 For discussion of Jones, see Bradley, supra note 17, at 583–86; Brown, supra 
note 267 at 1009–13. 
269 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (dissenting 
opinion). 
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Raich of this key analytical element of Lopez and Morrison should be seen as 
a significant victory by advocates of the New Federalism. 
Before they declare victory, however, there is another aspect of the 
majority opinion that should give them considerable pause: the absence of 
any reference to the nonattenuation principle that played such a fundamental 
role in Lopez and Morrison.270 In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist spent some time 
in addressing the government’s overall argument that “possession of a 
firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”271 Among other contentions, the government argued that there 
was a potential effect on travel to areas considered unsafe, but Justice 
Rehnquist’s main concern seemed to be with the following reasoning:  
[T]he presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the 
educational process by threatening the learning environment. A 
handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive 
citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation’s 
economic well-being. As a result, the Government argues that Congress 
could rationally have concluded that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate 
commerce.272
For Justice Rehnquist, such reasoning could lead to congressional power 
to regulate everything. For example, the “national productivity” argument 
could lead to congressional regulation of “any activity that it found was 
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law 
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.”273 Thus, if 
the attenuated causal chain was accepted, no areas would be off limits, and 
any activity by any individual would be subject to federal regulation. The 
result would be a national police power.274
In Morrison, Justice Rehnquist dealt with similar reasoning underlying 
the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:275 the notion that 
gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce by deterring travel, 
engaging in employment or transacting business, and by increasing medical 
and related costs, as well as decreasing the demand for interstate products.276 
He expressed concern over what he referred to as a “but-for causal chain” 
 
 
270 I have already referred to the absence of much of the basic New Federalism 
vocabulary in the opinion. 
271 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995). 
272 Id. at 564. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 567. 
275 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613–14 (2000). 
276 Id. at 615. 
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from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has 
always been the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated 
effect upon interstate commerce.277 Indeed, he expressed the concern that 
this reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime, since the 
aggregate effects of that crime could be seen as having a substantial impact 
on such economic factors as employment, production, or transit.278 The 
nonattenuation principle seemed in Lopez essentially to play the role of a 
supporting counter-argument to the government’s position. In Morrison, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist moved the principle a substantial step toward part of 
the core reasoning underlying the holding.279 Such a perception of Morrison 
would explain the nonattentuation principle’s incorporation into the four-part 
test that the courts of appeals had derived from Morrison.280 Apart from the 
degree to which the principle was central to the holding in either case, it is, 
from the New Federalism perspective, perhaps the most important 
contribution of Lopez and Morrison to the debate over the nature of our 
federal system.  
Justices Breyer and Souter really did seem to want to get rid of the 
federal system in its present form and let the national government regulate 
everything. Dissenting in Lopez, Justice Breyer cited globalization and other 
changes in the American economy as justification for a changing approach to 
Commerce Clause interpretation.281 He argued that Congress must at all 
times be able to utilize that power so that the nation is not “powerless to 
defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or 
destructive of the national economy.”282 In Morrison, Justice Souter 
criticized the majority for attempting to revive “the federalism of some 
earlier time,”283 and noted the high degree of integration that characterizes 
the national economy.284 Justice Breyer, if anything, went further and 
essentially called for the abandonment of any serious boundaries within the 
federal system, if not for the abandonment of the system itself: “We live in a 
Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, 
commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken together, mean 





279 Id. at 612.  
280 E.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222,1229–34 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (discussing the four-part test). 
281 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 621 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
282 Id. at 625 (quoting North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)). 
283 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
284 Id. 
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commerce, or its conditions, outside the State—at least when considered in 
the aggregate.”285 
As long as this reasoning is out there, the New Federalism, or any 
federalism, is in danger. Thus, Justice Stevens’s omission of any reference to 
the nonattenuation principle seems cause for concern. It should also be noted 
that this principle played an important role in the application of the four-part 
test by the Ninth Circuit, and in that court’s invalidation of the CSA as 
applied.286 In particular, the appeals court found the same danger of 
attenuation287 that Chief Justice Rehnquist cited in his Lopez and Morrison 
opinions.288 The court was concerned that the marijuana in question could 
only be regulated at the federal level through a highly attenuated analytical 
process which placed it within the realm of the national problem of 
marijuana by grouping together acts of possession that bore virtually no 
resemblance to each other.289 The notion that the plaintiff’s personal drugs 
might somehow affect the interstate market seemed an example of the 
discredited use of the house-that-Jack-built reasoning. 
However, the question in the two contexts is significantly different. 
Raich does not present the issue of what Congress can regulate, but how far 
into local, intrastate, activity federal regulation can penetrate. This, too, can 
be seen as a step toward regulating everything, but it requires the essential 
predicate of congressional authority to reach the subject in the first place. 
Thus, in considering the status of the nonattenuation principle, it is important 
to emphasize that Justice Stevens did draw a line that restricts congressional 
authority: the economic/commercial line.290 That line serves the same 
purposes as the nonattenuation principle, namely, confining national 
authority in order to preserve and advance federalism values. In this respect, 
it is instructive to read lower court applications of the four-part test, in which 
the economic/commercial nature of regulated activity is one factor, and the 
nonattenuation principle is another. Analyses of the two factors often overlap 
to the point of coalescing.291
 
 
285 Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Gey, supra note 2, at 1665–68 (questioning 
the nonattenuation argument and stating that “in the modern world neither crime nor, for 
that matter, marriage, divorce, and childbearing are local affairs”). 
286 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
287 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233. 
288 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612–15; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–67. 
289 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233. 
290 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
291 See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 869 (10th Cir. 2005) (facts of 
payment and transportation satisfy both the economic and the nonattenuation 
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It is true that one might view Raich as presenting the following 
attenuation issue: was the government positing an interconnectedness of 
marijuana so that small users could be grouped with interstate traffickers?292 
However, answering this question in the affirmative does not require 
recourse to amorphous concepts like the economic well-being of the nation to 
justify the similar treatment. It is the use of such hopelessly general concepts, 
and their ability to justify national regulation of everything, that the 
nonattenuation principle rejects. Thus, it seems possible to conclude that the 
nonattenuation principle—perhaps the heart of Lopez and Morrison—
survives Justice Stevens’ failure to mention it. The majority opinion in Raich, 
with its emphasis on the economic/commercial line, was, after all, joined by 
one member of the Lopez-Morrison majority,293 and the judgment was 
concurred in by another.294 Raich seems closer to the New Federalism of 
those cases than to the nonfederalism of Justices Breyer and Souter.  
In saying this, I do not overlook the possibility that Justice Stevens was 
able to slip by, so to speak, a modification of Lopez and Morrison, reducing 
those cases to Lopez-Lite. Most important is his deference to Congress and 
his use of the rational basis test. Moreover, the result of Raich was to 
overturn295 a circuit court opinion striking down federal regulation based 
largely on the application of Lopez and Morrison.296 Nonetheless, I view the 
opinion and result in the case as more of a stopping point, a refusal to extend, 
than any form of serious cutting back of the basic thrust of Lopez and 
Morrison.  
IV. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH 
A. The “Explosion” in Federal Criminal Law 
 
considerations); United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005), 
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (conduct not commercial; link too attenuated); United 
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (“inference upon inference” 
objection to viewing defendant’s conduct as economic) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)). 
292 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (“The connections in this case are, indeed, attenuated.”); 
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
interconnectedness of economic activity is not a modern phenomenon unfamiliar to the 
framers.”). 
293 Justice Kennedy. 
294 Justice Scalia. 
295 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201. 
296 Id. at 1234. 
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There has been a veritable explosion in the number of federal criminal 
laws over the last half century.297 Although precise numbers are hard to 
come by, it is usually estimated that there are at least 3000 federal crimes, 
and perhaps more than 3600.298 These crimes are not limited to narrow cases 
of federal interest, such as theft or bribery concerning federal funds,299 but 
spread across the entire range of the criminal law. According to Professors 
Abrams and Beale, “it is hard to think of a crime under state law that cannot 
be prosecuted federally.”300 This extraordinary increase can be attributed in 
part to the growth of new threats to national interests, such as terrorism and 
the international drug traffic, as well as to perceived state inability to deal 
with such threats. However, a Task Force of the American Bar Association 
recently offered a more cynical explanation for much of the trend: 
New crimes are often enacted in patchwork response to newsworthy 
events, rather than as part of a cohesive code developed in response to an 
identifiable federal need. . . . There is widespread recognition that a major 
reason for the federalization trend—even when federal prosecution of these 
crimes may not be necessary or effective—is that federal crime legislation 
is politically popular.301
Not surprisingly, the trend toward a rapid increase in the number of 
federal crimes has been seen by many as presenting a serious challenge to the 
values of American federalism. After all, the investigation and prosecution of 
criminal activity is a principal responsibility of the states.302 Judge Susan 
Ehrlich has stated that “federalization obscures the boundaries of political 
responsibility and accountability, undermines the confidence constituents 
have in their officials, and erodes the authority of state and local 
institutions.”303 The ABA Task Force weighed in against the trend, going so 
far as to state that “it is vital to remember that the American criminal justice 
 
 
297 Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Section, Task Force on the Federalization of 
Criminal Law, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7, 51 (1998) [hereinafter Report]; 
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 
65 (3d ed. 2000). 
298 Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 
825–26 (2000); Report, supra note 297, at 9–10 n.11 (noting difficulty of exact count but 
stating that the estimate of 3000 is almost certainly too low). 
299 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).  
300 ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 64. 
301 Report, supra note 297, at 14–15. 
302 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–12 (2000). 
303 Ehrlich, supra note 298, at 838. 
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system was set up to operate within distinct spheres of government.”304 
Collateral consequences have been criticized as well, for example, the risk of 
whipsawing defendants between the two systems and the general perception 
of unfairness generated by widely differing results.305
 
 
304 Report, supra note 297, at 24. 
305 Id. at 34–35. 
2005] NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH  
 
989
                                                                                                                  
B. Federal Criminal Law after Lopez and Morrison  
It was widely thought that the decision in Lopez, supplemented by 
Morrison, would have an impact on this development.306 Lopez was a 
federalism-based decision striking down a federal criminal law. The majority 
noted, albeit in a footnote, the role of the states in criminal law enforcement. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, while focusing on education, 
suggested the possibility of spheres of state responsibility.307 Lopez 
potentially reined in the Commerce Clause basis for congressional power by 
relying on the economic/commercial line as necessary for the validity of 
federal legislation, and articulating the nonattenuation principle. Morrison 
went further, particularly in its focus on crime. The majority referred to the 
suppression of violent crime as a matter “which has always been the prime 
object of the States’ police power,”308 and made clear that a wide-ranging 
federal criminal law ran counter to its vision of the federal system. However, 
it should be noted that not even Morrison rested on any notion of a “sphere”; 
rather it applied the Lopez analysis, relying heavily on the noneconomic 
nature of violence against women, and also invoking the nonattenuation 
principle.309
Even before Morrison, federal defendants rushed to attack federal 
criminal statutes. However, their efforts were virtually always 
unsuccessful.310 There are several reasons for this sharp divergence. In part, 
it may simply be that the lower courts regarded Lopez as something of a 
“sport,” that is, a case that presented such an unusual fact pattern that it led to 
a one-of-a-kind result. The principal reason appears to have been the 
presence in the relevant statutes of a jurisdictional element, that is, a 
requirement that the defendant’s conduct either have an effect on commerce, 
or more frequently, that the defendant or some object connected with the 
 
 
306 E.g., Brown, supra note 267, at 985. 
307 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995). 
308 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). 
309 Id. at 613, 615.  
310 Bradley, supra note 17, at 575 (referring to the “nearly unanimous views of the 
courts of appeals”); Brown, supra note 267, at 985 n.19 (citing United States v. Trupin, 
117 F.3d 678, 685 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“Numerous statutes have been upheld against 
post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges in this and other courts.”); United States v. 
Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v. 
Serrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United 
States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585–88 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119)); see 
generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 32, 54 (discussing trend in courts of 
appeal). 
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crime have traveled in interstate commerce.311 It should be noted that the 
Lopez Court (as was later the case in Morrison) distinguished the statute 
before it on the grounds that it contained no such jurisdictional element.312 
Thus, it was easy for the lower courts to conclude either that the mere 
presence of a jurisdictional element saved a statute from possible invalidity, 
or to construe statutes using this technique in a way that made satisfying the 
requirements of the elements a simple task for prosecutors. Raich is an 
example of a small group of cases in which lower courts did use Lopez and 
Morrison to strike down criminal statutes.313 Federal prosecutions of highly 
personal, intrastate activity such as home-grown marijuana and family 
pornography appeared to these courts to go beyond the outer edge of any 
class of activities that Congress could regulate.314 Not even the presence of a 
jurisdictional element was sufficient in the pornography cases.315 These 
courts utilized the four-part test drawn from Morrison’s elaboration on 
Lopez, and emphasized the economic/commercial line and the nonattenuation 
principle in striking down statutes.316 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
strengthened the possibility of constitutional analysis in its decision in Jones 
v. United States,317 which utilized the constitutional precepts of Lopez and 
Morrison to guide statutory construction in a manner that led to finding the 
federal arson statute’s requirements unmet.318  
Thus, as of the early 2000s, there existed a curious dichotomy between 
the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The former had three times sent 
strong signals that there are constitutional limits to the development of 
federal criminal law.319 Yet the latter seemed virtually to ignore these 
signals.320 The momentum behind the growing body of federal criminal law 
had certainly not stopped. Congress continued to consider a wide range of 




311 E.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585–88 (3d Cir. 1995). 
312 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
313 See generally Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
314 E.g., id.  at 1234. 
315 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003). 
316 E.g., Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229–34. 
317 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 851 (2000). 
318 Id. at 858–59. 
319 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Jones v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
320 Bradley, supra note 17, at 575. 
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hundreds of bills were introduced having to do with federal criminal 
statutes, many of which pertained to juvenile justice, including one 
unsuccessful measure that would require that 14- and 15-year-olds be tried 
as adults if accused of offenses constituting what Congress defines as 
serious violent crimes or drug offenses.321  
Despite the Supreme Court cases, the authors of such bills could point to 
widely differing results in the lower courts, should constitutional objections 
be raised. Indeed, the ABA Task Force report, published three years after 
Lopez, reached the surprising conclusion that the political process is the only 
check on the growth of federal criminal statutes: “[t]he opportunity to limit 
the excessive federalization of local crimes rests entirely with Congress.”322  
C. Federal Criminal Law After Raich 
Whatever momentum existed before 2005, Raich can only sustain and 
probably increase it. Once the Court has concluded that a statute passes the 
initial hurdle for substantial effects analysis, as was the case in Raich, 
Congress’s power to legislate broadly under that category is striking. As 
Professor Bradley remarked, prior to Raich, “[a]s long as the ‘substantial 
effects’ test remains on the books, federal criminal jurisdiction, even if 
somewhat constrained, will continue to be broad.”323 The six to three 
decision upheld a federal criminal statute, using Wickard-based analysis, at 
the outer limits of its intrastate application. As noted, Raich seemed to reject 
any “sphere” or other state sovereignty notion of limiting federal law, and did 
not give support to the approach of subjecting federal statutes to a four-part 
test based on Lopez and Morrison.324  
Raich, however, does not mean carte blanche, as long as Lopez and 
Morrison are on the books.325 After all, the economic/commercial line does 
have to be satisfied, and Lopez and Morrison demonstrate that there are 
class-of-activity statutes that do not satisfy it. I have argued above that a high 
degree of acceptance of the nonattenuation principle is implicit in Raich,326 
but admit that the matter is somewhat left up in the air. Battles remain to be 
fought. It is likely that the wide use of jurisdictional elements will come 
 
 
321 Ehrlich, supra note 298, at 825. 
322 Report, supra note 297, at 51. 
323 Bradley, supra note 17, at 579. 
324 See supra Part II.B. 
325 Like Professor Bradley, I have argued that the constitutional overtones of Jones 
are also significant. Bradley, supra note 17, at 573; Brown, supra note 267, at 1009. 
326 See supra notes 290–91. 
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under increasing scrutiny.327 Some courts have already indicated a 
willingness to hold jurisdictional elements ineffective to sustain federal 
legislative power. Questions of limits will remain, although the remands of 
several decisions favorable to defendants for consideration in light of 
Raich328 suggest that the hospitable attitude demonstrated in Raich will 
continue to have an effect. Overall, the notion of an expansive federal 
criminal law is strengthened by the decision. The main question now may 
shift to consideration of what it should look like. In this respect, the ABA 
Task Force’s emphasis on the legislative process seems vindicated. Indeed, it 
would be an anomaly of the New Federalism if the area in which it appeared 
to have made some of its greatest gains—the criminal law—was now 
remitted to the congressional process and the “political safeguards of 
federalism” that often are the antithesis of the federalism found in Lopez.  
It seems clear that we will have a wide-ranging federal criminal law 
rather than one based on notions of spheres or of a sharp demarcation 
between the two levels of government. It is true that the debate will continue, 
a debate that Professors Abrams and Beale have characterized “as a 
disagreement between the federalizers and the anti-federalizers,”329 but the 
former are clearly in the ascendancy. Furthermore, it is doubtful that any 
significant limit can be imposed by a search for “principles” that perform a 
sub-constitutional function of demarcation.330 Thus, what we are likely to 
see, as is already the case to a considerable degree, is an increasing overlap 
between criminal statutes at both the state and federal levels. In an important 
article, Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg defend this model vigorously: 
It is often impossible to draft a statute in a way that includes only those 
crimes that are sophisticated, interjurisdictional, or sensitive enough to 
require a federal solution. In order to allow sufficient flexibility to bring a 
federal prosecution when an aspect of a law enforcement problem requires 
it, federal criminal legislation inevitably will have to be overinclusive.331 
 
 
327 Brown, supra note 267, at 1013–23. 
328 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 
(2005); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 
321 (2005); Klingler v. Director Dept. Rev., 366 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2899 (2005). 
329 ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 65. 
330 See id. at 68. 
331 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 964–65. Professor Kurland has 
demonstrated that historically the states and federal government have had concurrent 
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Advocates of a broad federal criminal law point out that this model has 
been continuously present since the early days of the Republic.332 The Court 
has not been hospitable to efforts to curtail it. A unanimous decision 
concerning the scope of the Hobbs Act stated that “[w]ith regard to the 
concern about disturbing the federal state balance . . . there is no question 
that Congress intended to define as a federal crime conduct that it knew was 
punishable under state law.”333 The New Federalists were swimming 
upstream when they attempted to establish spheres of state authority, 
particularly the criminal law.334 Raich makes the task even harder. 
D. As-Applied Challenges in the Commerce Clause Context 
Raich appears to have put to rest the controverted question of whether as-
applied challenges can be brought to the intrastate manifestations of federal 
statutes regulating interstate commerce. That there is an issue at all is 
surprising given what Professor Fallon calls the “familiar understanding that 
as-applied challenges are the normal mode of constitutional adjudication.”335 
The Supreme Court has often expressed strong reservations about facial 
challenges—the analytical technique at the other end of the constitutional 
spectrum from as-applied challenges.336 In the 2004 decision of Sabri v. 
United States, the Court stated: 
Although passing on the validity of a law wholesale may be efficient in the 
abstract, any gain is often offset by losing the lessons taught by the 
particular, to which common law method normally looks. Facial 
adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature interpretatio[n] of 
statutes’ on the basis of factually bare-bones records.337  
 
jurisdiction in the area of criminal law. Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American 
Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996). 
332 See Henning, supra note 227, at 413 (The Court “has historically accepted that 
federal provisions operate in many areas already subject to state regulation. The fact that 
both the federal and state governments can enforce criminal laws covering similar 
conduct has not been troubling in a constitutional sense.”); Kurland, supra note 331, at 58 
(discussing overlapping criminal jurisdiction in the context of the postal power). 
333 United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). 
334 See Henning, supra note 227, at 394 n.32.  
335 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1329 (2000). 
336 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Fallon, supra note 335, at 
1342–59. 
337 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (alteration in original) (citing 
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).  
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On the other hand, as-applied challenges have the advantage of 
considering statutes in the context of particular applications. As Professor 
Fallon puts it, “statutes often are best understood as encompassing a number 
of subrules, which frequently are specified only in the process of statutory 
application, and . . . some subrules may validly be applied even if others may 
not.”338
In the Commerce Clause context, however, doubt has existed about 
whether litigants could challenge a generally valid statute when the challenge 
was to the law’s application to their intrastate, small-scale activities. The 
main source of these doubts was the famous quote from Maryland v. 
Wirtz,339 repeated frequently by the Court, including in the majority opinion 
in Lopez, that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation 
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under 
that statute is of no consequence.”340 The decision in Perez v. United 
States341 is illustrative of the approach embodied in the quote. Perez involved 
the application of a general law on “extortionate credit transactions” to a 
local loan shark. The Supreme Court reviewed and accepted Congress’s 
conclusion that loan-sharking was a national problem, frequently tied to 
organized crime.342 The Court concluded that Congress could properly deal 
with loan-sharking as a class of activities.343 Since the defendant was a 
member of the class, the principle articulated in Wirtz controlled.344  
It can thus be argued that substantive Commerce Clause doctrine bars as-
applied challenges of the sort presented in Raich. This was the position taken 
 
 
338 Fallon, supra note 335, at 1334. It should be noted that Fallon does not regard 
the distinction between the two types of challenges as clear cut. 
339 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968). 
340 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). As the Ninth Circuit has pointed 
out, that sentence originated in a discussion of congressional power to regulate all aspects 
of a single enterprise. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (“Read in context, the sentence . . . can only mean that 
where a general regulatory statute governs a large enterprise, it does not matter that its 
components have a de minimus relation to interstate commerce on their own.”). Stewart, 
348 F.3d at 1141. However, the sentence has taken on a life of its own and is generally 
read broadly as its language invites. 
341 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
342 Id. at 157. 
343 Id. at 153–55. 
344 Id. at 154 (citing Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193). In Perez the Court stated cryptically 
that “[i]n the setting of the present case there is a tie-in between local loan sharks and 
interstate crime.” Id. at 155. 
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by Judge Trott in United States v. McCoy,345 a case involving “personal” 
intrastate child pornography. He drew on Wirtz and on other Supreme Court 
cases to conclude that “if the general regulatory statute at issue does bear a 
substantial relation to commerce, an ‘as applied’ challenge is 
inappropriate.”346 He then applied Lopez and Morrison, as well as the four-
part test that courts of appeals had distilled from them, to determine whether 
the general statute on child pornography was valid.347 The defendant’s 
conduct was irrelevant to the inquiry. A strong argument can be made that 
Judge Trott was correct. An as-applied challenge permits reconsideration of 
the validity of regulation of the class after that issue has been decided. It 
represents a sort of second constitutional bite at the apple.  
However, Judge Trott was dissenting from a decision in which a majority 
of the Ninth Circuit did precisely what he viewed as forbidden: entertain an 
as-applied challenge to the intrastate conduct at issue.348 The majority 
utilized the same four factors to resolve what it specifically described as an 
as-applied challenge.349 It stated the issue as follows:  
[W]hether a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause may 
constitutionally reach non-commercial, non-economic individual conduct 
that is purely intrastate in nature, when there is no reasonable basis for 
concluding that the conduct had or was intended to have any significant 
interstate connection or any substantive effect on interstate commerce.350
In a recent important article, Professor Henning has criticized cases such 
as McCoy, and the lower courts’ willingness to entertain as-applied 
challenges to federal criminal prosecutions.351 He sees the lower courts as 
improperly utilizing federalism principles as an additional check—beyond 
any statutory or constitutional inquiry—to block interference by federal 
prosecutors with inherently local crimes. He warns that  
[t]he application of federalism to prohibit a particular prosecution of an 
offense—despite the constitutionality of the statute—because a federal 
court deems the conduct to fall within the category of a ‘truly local’ crime 
 
 
345 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., 
dissenting). 
346 Id. at 1135. 
347 Id. at 1137–40. 
348 See id. at 1133. 
349 Id. at 1119; see also United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140–43 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (discussing and defending as-applied challenges). 
350 Id. at 1117.  
351 Henning, supra note 227, at 436–42. 
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has the hallmark of a standardless judicial authority to assess the propriety 
of the decision to prosecute.352  
Professor Henning is certainly correct that the lower courts often express 
a preference for state prosecution of local matters353 and refer frequently to 
federalism issues in the context of the prosecutions he discusses.354 However, 
it is also possible, in some cases, to view the lower courts as engaging in 
Commerce Clause analysis, as the Ninth Circuit maintained in McCoy.355 
Like other commentators, Professor Henning accepts the validity of 
Professor Monaghan’s concept of the “valid rule of law” requirement: the 
right to be governed by laws that are within the power of the legislature to 
enact.356 The question then becomes whether Congress’s power to reach 
intrastate manifestations of an activity it can regulate on the interstate level is 
part of the issue of the statute’s validity. In theory, the valid interstate 
component shields the rule from a facial challenge of the Lopez variety. 
Nonetheless, is the challenge to intrastate application a form of challenge to 
the rule’s validity? 
One might contend that once the basic issue of the rule’s validity is 
settled, any challenges to intrastate applications are of the as-applied variety 
and are subject to the limitations on such claims. Professor Henning states 
that an as-applied challenge involves the assertion of individual rights such 
as free speech or trial by jury.357 The Commerce Clause may not be a source 
of such rights. “The Commerce Clause—or the other enumerated powers—
does not provide individuals with any rights beyond the requirement of a 
valid rule adopted pursuant to a legitimate exercise of constitutional 
 
 
352 Id. at 446–47. 
353 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). 
354 Henning, supra note 227, at 395–96. Professor Henning states: 
[s]ome lower courts, encouraged by off-handed references in Supreme Court 
opinions about the limiting effect of federalism on congressional authority to reach 
certain types of crimes, have taken that cue to reject the federal government’s power 
to pursue a particular case even when the statute itself is a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate. This application of federalism creates a new form of 
judicial supervisory authority to invoke a vague constitutional limitation—one not 
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution—to limit the national government's power 
to pursue criminal prosecutions.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
355 See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1117–31. 
356 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3–4; Henning, 
supra note 227, at 432; Fallon, supra note 335, at 1327. 
357 Henning, supra note 227, at 436. 
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authority.”358 Once the facial validity of a statute is established, there is 
nothing left for the individual litigant to assert in the as-applied challenge. 
On the other hand, the challenge to intrastate application does seem 
similar to a valid rule argument: Congress’s power does not reach the 
subclass of activities in which the challenger participates; thus it lacks 
authority to regulate those activities. The challenger is asserting at the 
intrastate level the same valid rule right asserted in Lopez at the interstate 
level.359 There are two bites at the apple because there are two apples 
(indeed, there might be multiple bites at the intrastate apple360). Even Perez 
may provide support for such an approach. It referred to the general rule 
about class-of-activities statutes with the possible qualification that the class 
be “within the reach of federal power.”361 For the Ninth Circuit in Raich, this 
requirement was key to its ability to analyze the constitutionality of the CSA 
as applied to the subclass of intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, 
possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice 
of a physician and in accordance with state law.362 From the New Federalist 
point of view, one might add that the breadth of judicial review of federalism 
issues is directly related to the availability of that review in the first place. 
Thus, New Federalists would be expected to favor as-applied challenges as a 
general matter. Moreover, it is only through such challenges that the courts 
can resolve the difficult problems posed by “outer limits” cases such as the 
pornography cases discussed below.363  
 
 
358 Id. at 443. But see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (“The Court has 
often described the Commerce Clause as conferring a ‘right’ to engage in interstate trade 
free from restrictive state regulation.”). The Court held that a successful challenge to state 
regulation on dormant Commerce Clause grounds entitled the challenger to attorney’s 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because he had successfully asserted “rights, privileges, or 
immunities” under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 446. The result effectively overrules 
Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 1984) (The 
Commerce Clause is not a source of rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.). 
359 In Raich, Justice Thomas compared the challenge in that case to Lopez and 
Morrison and stated that “[t]here is no reason why, when Congress exceeds the scope of 
its commerce power, courts may not invalidate Congress’[s] overreaching on a case-by-
case basis.” Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2238 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
360 See United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing 
possibility of multiple as-applied challenges to child pornography statutes). At some 
point, probably sooner rather than later, substantive Commerce Clause doctrine or 
principles of stare decisis would operate to stop a succession of challenges.  
361 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).  
362 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
363 See infra notes 418–55. 
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In any event, the Supreme Court decision in Raich appears to validate 
unequivocally as-applied challenges to intrastate permutations of regulations 
of interstate commerce such as the CSA. All four opinions in the case discuss 
the challengers’ circumstances and the bearing of Wickard on them.364 Thus, 
all four opinions can be said to consider the constitutionality of the CSA as 
applied to the subclass before the Court. Justice Stevens and Justice 
O’Connor specifically described the class involved.365 For Justice Scalia, the 
regulation in question was valid “however the class of regulated activities is 
subdivided.”366 Justice Thomas agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s description of 
the class.367 There remains the troubling question whether one is free to bring 
an as-applied challenge in such circumstances, but will always lose. Justice 
Stevens invoked the Wirtz quote,368 and stated that the Court’s Commerce 
Clause cases “foreclose” the challengers’ claim.369 On the other hand, he 
engaged in an extensive analysis of how that claim fared under Wickard, in 
particular.370 In theory, at least, plaintiffs might have won, as they did below. 
The Ninth Circuit’s error lay not in hearing their claim, but in getting it 
wrong.  
E. Jurisdictional Elements—The Last Frontier 
Raich solidifies the status of class-of-activity statutes. Attention will now 
turn to one of the most controversial issues in federal criminal law: the role 
of jurisdictional elements in criminal statutes passed under the commerce 
power.371 Although New Federalists have seemed to favor these statutes, 
they have the potential to totally undermine federalism and to lead to a true 
national police power. It may be helpful to review the distinction between the 
two types of statutes. A class-of-activity statute singles out a particular form 
of criminal activity, for example, loan-sharking; defines it (extortionate credit 
transactions in which a threat of violence or other crime underlies the 
 
 
364 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206–08 (Stevens, J., writing for the majority); id. at 2217 
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2225–27 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
365 Id. at 2211–16 (majority opinion) (narrowing class as defined by lower court); 
id. at 2226–28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
366 Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
367 Id. at 2233, 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
368 Id. at 2206 (majority opinion). 
369 Id. at 2215.  
370 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–09 (2005). 
371 See generally Henning, supra note 227, at 429–31 (discussing jurisdictional 
elements and their importance after Lopez and Morrison). 
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obligation to repay); and provides criminal penalties. A jurisdictional 
element statute adds to the criminal activity a specific link to interstate 
commerce. This link is an element of the crime, and the prosecution must 
prove it as part of its case. For example, the Travel Act punishes any person 
who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses . . . any facility in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent to” commit certain crimes.372 
The Hobbs Act punishes any person who  
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical 
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do 
anything in violation of this section.373  
What accounts for the difference between these two techniques of 
statutory drafting under the Commerce Clause? Justice Breyer has suggested 
that the difference may reflect a congressional choice to deal with a matter 
either “instance by instance” or “problem by problem.”374 Congress may not 
be able to define the problem in advance in a manner that is consistent with 
its constitutional authority. For example, the Hobbs Act seems to recognize 
that not all robberies affect commerce, but that some may. The conservative 
members of the Court have taken the matter a step further and expressed an 
apparent preference for jurisdictional element statutes.375 They see the 
jurisdictional element as a technique for limiting federal authority. In Lopez, 
the majority noted that the statute “contains no jurisdictional element which 
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in 
question affects interstate commerce.”376 In Morrison, the same majority 
repeated this quote and underscored its importance in the following terms: 
“[s]uch a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in 
pursuance of Congress’[s] regulation of interstate commerce.”377  
However, it is important to distinguish between what can be referred to 
as “effects” elements and “nexus” elements.378 The former tie the criminal 
 
 
372 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994). 
373 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). 
374 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630–31 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
375 E.g., id. at 561. 
376 Id. 
377 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000). 
378 Brown, supra note 267, at 1014; see ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 31 
(“Issues that arise in connection with the ‘affecting commerce’ formula and concerns 
about this approach are quite different from those that attach to the transportation or 
travel across a state line jurisdictional basis.”). 
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activity in question closely to the third category of Commerce Clause 
authority recognized in Lopez: substantial effects on interstate commerce. 
Nexus elements, however, derive from categories one and two, as outlined in 
that case, particularly the power over the “channels” of interstate 
commerce.379 The potential problem for conservatives is that virtually 
everything or every person moves in interstate commerce at some point, and 
that nexus elements could lead to open-ended congressional power. A good 
example is the federal child pornography statute, utilizing as one 
jurisdictional element the fact that the materials used to produce the 
pornography had traveled in “interstate commerce.”380  
Raich itself is directly relevant to statutes with effects elements. Its 
emphasis on the economic/commercial line indicates the necessity for such 
conduct at some point in the case. Professor Bradley breaks this inquiry 
down by arguing for a focus either on the defendant’s conduct or on the 
victim’s status.381 Consider a prosecution under the Hobbs Act for extortion 
of a public official. One might argue that extortion is itself a consensual 
economic transaction.382 Professor Bradley’s analysis would focus on the 
importance to the national economy of the political process and its 
decisions.383 Either way, the effects element is satisfied. Robbery cases are 
harder to deal with under the Hobbs Act. Robbery is not an 
economic/commercial activity. Thus, federal jurisdiction would, initially, 
depend on the commercial nature of the person or entity robbed. Robberies of 
private individuals would probably not satisfy a rigorous application of the 
economic/commercial line, while those of businesses would. As Professor 
Bradley puts it, “robbery of a pizza deliveryman while he is on duty violates 
the Hobbs Act. Robbery of him off-duty does not.”384
 
 
379 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
380 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000). The alternative jurisdictional element is 
satisfied if the visual depiction “has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” Id. 
381 Bradley, supra note 17, at 604–05. 
382 Brown, supra note 267, at 1022; Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal 
Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 134 (Fall 2003-2004). 
383 Bradley, supra note 17, at 587–90; see also Henning, supra note 382, at 123 
(contending that because “[c]orruption is largely an economic offense,” Congress could 
use the Commerce Clause to criminalize state and local bribery). Professor Henning 
states his overall view of the matter as follows: “Misuse of governmental authority 
enriches both officeholders and those offering bribes because it is likely to result in a 
misallocation of governmental resources.” Id. 
384 Bradley, supra note 17, at 610. Repeated robberies by those “in the business” of 
robbery would constitute commerce and represent an example of Professor Bradley’s 
focus on the defendant. 
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It is at this point that jurisdictional element statutes utilizing the effects 
approach diverge from their class-of-activities counterparts by apparently 
requiring a quantitative analysis of the individual case. Although the Hobbs 
Act uses the verb “affect,” the lesson of Lopez would appear to be that a 
substantial effect is necessary in category three situations.385 Thus, even 
when the prosecution has gotten over the economic/commercial line, it still 
faces a quantitative dilemma. As Justice O’Connor has stated: “individual 
litigants could always exempt themselves from Commerce Clause regulation 
merely by pointing to the obvious—that their personal activities do not have 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”386 In theory, a jurisprudence 
could be developed establishing just how much individual activity is enough. 
There is support for a case-by-case inquiry. For example, in the Jones arson 
case, the government argued that the substantial threshold was met when an 
out-of-state insurer was obliged to pay more than $75,000 for the arson in 
question.387 A number of alternative solutions have been suggested, 
including a de minimis effect on commerce,388 but the inquiry probably turns 
on whether the defendant’s conduct can be aggregated with similar instances 
to determine whether activity of that nature and volume creates a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. I believe that Professor Bradley is correct in 
his view that aggregation is possible.389 While I have argued elsewhere that 
there is a serious question “whether one may legitimately apply class of 
activity analysis to an individualized form of draftsmanship such as an effect 
element,”390 the endorsement in Raich of as-applied challenges to class-of-
activities statutes suggests that courts will engage in similar inquiries 
whether evaluating a subclass under such a statute, or the effects of 
individual conduct on interstate commerce in the case of a statute with an 
effects jurisdictional element. In each case, the aggregation technique of 
Wickard will be utilized.  
Defendants in Raich-type challenges ask for a focus on their activities, 
but the courts routinely consider the way in which the statute applies to all 
 
 
385 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).  
386 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
387 Brown, supra note 267, at 1019–20; see United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 
243–44 (5th Cir. 1999) (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting) (“[T]he truly determinative 
question . . . is whether the conduct in this case ‘substantially affects interstate 
commerce.’ It is that standard, after all, which is our constitutional touchstone, and which 
should ultimately control the outcome of this case.”).  
388 See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 216–18 (discussing 
alternative solutions). 
389 Bradley, supra note 17, at 593; see generally id. at 592–597 (discussing 
competing theories). 
390 Brown, supra note 267, at 1019.  
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those similarly situated.391 The same approach should apply to jurisdictional 
element challenges. The situations are analytically alike: an apparent focus 
on one person requires consideration of all those similarly situated to 
measure effect on commerce. The constitutional question is whether 
Congress can regulate such persons, not just one individual. In addition, it 
would be awkward if the Court offered advice to Congress as to how best to 
draft federal statutes that would lead to most statutes being unconstitutional. 
Thus, the two techniques of statutory draftsmanship come close to 
merging.392
Let us apply this analysis to Raich itself, assuming that the statute had 
been drafted to forbid any possession of marijuana with an effect on 
interstate commerce. The first question is whether economic/commercial 
activity is present at all. Possession seems like a classic case of an activity 
that falls outside the line, and we can perhaps assume that cultivation for 
one’s own use also falls outside. Nonetheless, there is the analysis utilized in 
Raich, and derived from Wickard, that the homegrown marijuana 
“overhangs”393 the market and threatens to enter it.394 There is also the threat 
to the federal regulatory scheme posed by the difficulties for law 
enforcement officials in any attempt to distinguish between intrastate and 
interstate marijuana. Thus, the economic/commercial line is satisfied. If the 
conduct can be aggregated, as in a class-of-activities statute, utilization of a 
jurisdictional element would lead to the same result, based on the same 
analysis. 
As for nexus jurisdictional elements, they have long been a staple of the 
federal criminal law. Professors Abrams and Beale state that “federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the commerce power has most often been based 
on the direct crossing of an interstate boundary by way of transportation, 
shipping, traveling or the like.”395 The lower courts’ receptive attitude toward 
nexus statutes is a principal reason for the failure of Lopez-based 
 
 
391 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the 
issue in the case as “the application [of the statute] to McCoy in the circumstances 
present here (or to others in similar circumstances).”). 
392 See United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating the 
Hobbs Act as regulating general conduct and applying aggregation analysis); United 
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Wirtz analysis concerning 
general regulatory statutes to Hobbs Act). There may be a certain tension between 
advocacy of jurisdictional element statutes, on the one hand, and hostility to Wickard on 
the other. 
393 Wickard v. Filburn, 371 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). 
394 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. 
395 ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 20. 
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challenges.396 An interesting exception is the treatment of the child 
pornography statute.397 The law is aimed at visual depictions involving the 
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. One of the alternative 
jurisdictional elements is that the offending material “was produced using 
materials which have been mailed or shipped or transported [in interstate or 
foreign commerce].”398 Obviously, this, like some other nexus elements, is 
virtually meaningless, given the fact that photographic and similar materials 
will almost always have an interstate shipment dimension. In United States v. 
McCoy, the Ninth Circuit ruled that this jurisdictional element failed to 
achieve the basic goal of limiting the reach of a federal statute to a discrete 
set of activities.399 It noted that the statute “encompasses virtually every case 
imaginable, so long as any modern-day photographic equipment or material 
has been used.”400 The court went on to decide the case as if the 
jurisdictional element were absent.401 However, it focused on the relationship 
between the requirement and the effect on interstate commerce, virtually 
ignoring the possibility that the jurisdictional element could be viewed as an 
example of legislation passed under categories one or two as outlined in 
Lopez.402 Yet the fact of extensive movement of persons and goods in 
interstate commerce makes it plausible to uphold such jurisdictional elements 
under a channels analysis. In turn, such an approach means that Congress can 
regulate virtually anything as long as it can make the tie to “commerce.” As 
Diane McGimsey puts it, the Court in Lopez “evinced no intention to 
reexamine the channels or instrumentalities prongs of Congress’s ability to 
regulate under those prongs. Further, by highlighting the absence of a 
jurisdictional element, the Court implied that its addition would validate an 
 
 
396 E.g., United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 685 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Numerous 
statutes have been upheld against post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges in this and 
other courts.”); United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 
U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585–88 (3d Cir. 
1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119). Professors Abrams and Beale also note a hospitable 
attitude towards the Hobbs Act—an effects statute—even after Lopez. ABRAMS & BEALE, 
supra note 297, at 32.  
397 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000). 
398 Id. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 
399 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2003). 
400 Id. at 1124. 
401 Id. 
402 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
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otherwise unconstitutional statute.”403 Congress is likely to take up the 
invitation.404
Commentators vary sharply as to the desirability of this situation, 
although it seems hard to believe that the Court would go to such great 
lengths to limit congressional power under one major technique, only to 
endorse the possibility of circumventing its holdings through the use of 
jurisdictional elements. McGimsey states that 
[t]he Court’s failure to put meaningful limits on the use of a 
jurisdictional element to invoke Congress’s Commerce Clause power leaves 
federalism in the same place it was before the Court decided Lopez and 
Morrison—seriously at risk. Federalism depends on limiting the use of the 
commerce power to when there is a true connection to interstate commerce. 
The current presumption that the crossing of state lines ensures a connection 
to interstate commerce is erroneous.405  
Some analysts are clearly not disturbed by the prospect that broad use of 
nexus elements can lead to unlimited congressional power. Professors Stacy 
and Dayton have stated that “a nexus with interstate commerce can be shown 
in every case.”406 Professor Bradley, on the other hand, has expressed 
doubts.407 Indeed, Professors Nelson and Pushaw have recommended 
eliminating jurisdiction based on categories one and two.408
It is possible to analyze nexus elements as presenting an example of the 
nonattenuation or noninfinity problem. That is, since virtually all people and 
goods will have some connection with commerce through movement, 
Congress can regulate them under the commerce power. This argument is 
strikingly similar to that which the Court rejected in Lopez and Morrison 
when confronted with arguments based on the commercial 
 
 
403 Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and 
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1675, 1704 (2002).  
404 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 940–54 (discussing revised Gun Free 
School Zones Act based on movement of firearms in interstate commerce, and the basis 
of the new statute in categories one and two). 
405 McGimsey, supra note 403, at 1706. McGimsey states that “the lower federal 
courts have consistently upheld statutes based on the mere presence of a jurisdictional 
element.” Id. at 1709.  
406 Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 247, 297 (1997).  
407 Bradley, supra note 17, at 600. 
408 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 107–13. 
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interconnectedness of our society.409 Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg 
have mounted a spirited defense of a broad use of nexus jurisdictional 
elements, although even they recognize the need for some limits.410 Their 
essential formulation is as follows: whatever the outer limits on the 
commerce power, the use of the power to regulate harms of which interstate 
commerce is a cause is straightforward.411 They recognize the problem of 
happenstance movement in interstate commerce, and recommend an 
approach similar to the proximate cause concept widespread in torts 
analysis.412 Diane McGimsey has examined a series of limitations and 
focuses on what she refers to as the “purpose-nexus requirement.”413 I do not 
think that Raich provides any direct answer to the question, although, as 
argued above, its insistence on the economic/commercial line also should be 
taken as expressing support for a limited commerce power such as that 
guaranteed by the nonattenuation principle. In any event, over the course of 
ten years, the Court has issued three major decisions on the constitutional 
dimensions of substantial effects regulation.414 One should probably add the 
important statutory construction decision in Jones.415 It is time for guidance 
as to how to handle regulation under categories one and two through the use 
of jurisdictional elements of the nexus variety. The Court may have provided 
the beginning of this guidance when it remanded a gun control case for 
reconsideration in light of Raich.416 However, in the remanded case, the 
court of appeals had taken a narrow view of nexus elements.417
 
 
409 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
410 Litman & Greenberg supra note 20, at 921.  
411 Id. at 950. 
412 Id. at 921; see ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 28. 
413 McGimsey, supra note 403, at 1731–35 (“The purpose nexus would solve most 
of the problems discussed earlier regarding the lower courts’ opinions, both by limiting 
statutes that might legitimately fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause power but have 
been too expansively interpreted, and by invalidating statutes that do not fall within 
Congress's Commerce Clause power at all.”). 
414 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
415 See generally Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
416 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 
(2005). 
417 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 (“[J]ust because certain of the elements that make up 
an object have traveled interstate at one time or another, this does not necessarily mean 
Congress can regulate that object under the Commerce Clause.”); see also United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 n.5 (2000) (suggesting approval of criminal provisions of 
the Violence Against Women Act based on their requirement of interstate travel). 
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F. Raich and the Outer Limits of Federal Criminal Law 
Raich poses, in stark form, the question of the outer limits of federal 
criminal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause: at what point is an 
activity so intrastate, so removed from “commerce,” and, seemingly, so 
removed from the concerns of the federal government that the latter should 
not be able to regulate it? The general problem may be referred to as that of 
parallel private activity. As Justice O’Connor put it in her Raich dissent:  
Most commercial goods or services have some sort of privately producible 
analogue. Homecare substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for 
movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going to 
the supermarket. To draw the line wherever private activity affects the 
demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything 
economic. We have already rejected the result that would follow—a federal 
police power.418
The theme is a recurring one among conservative judges, and often leads 
to a parade of horribles. Justice Thomas, in Raich, raised the question of 
whether the national government may now “regulate quilting bees, clothes 
drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 states.”419 Assuming that there 
is no separate external limit on broad uses of the commerce power to reach 
intrastate activity, the answer must be found in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence itself. The source of the problem, if it is one, is the opinion in 
Wickard, and its broad willingness to embrace small-scale intrastate activity 
in a general regulatory scheme.420
The much-litigated field of “personal” pornography provides a good 
example.421 The key provision of the federal statutory scheme in question 
 
 
418 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She referred explicitly to 
the “outer limits” of the Commerce Clause, id. at 2223, and to Justice Kennedy’s defense 
of judicial review in enforcing them. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231, 233 n.32 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing broad application of the Commerce Clause to intrastate activity on 
the ground that “[a]n intrastate market exists for virtually any product one might 
possess.”). 
419 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
420 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own 
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him 
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with 
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”) (citation omitted). 
421 E.g., United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 
2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6 
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makes it a crime to “knowingly possesses 1 or more books, magazines, 
periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual 
depiction . . . if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of 
such conduct.”422 The 2003 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. 
McCoy423 is worth in-depth consideration for several reasons. First, the facts 
present a compelling argument for a private, personal, non-commercial act. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit decision in Raich, reversed by the Supreme 
Court, relied heavily on McCoy.424 Finally, the Supreme Court’s action in 
vacating and remanding two child pornography cases425 for reconsideration 
in light of Raich, may shed light on earlier cases such as McCoy.  
McCoy presented a tawdry set of facts, typical of many of these cases.426 
Apparently under the influence of alcohol, a father photographed his wife 
and ten-year-old stepdaughter. The photograph of the daughter meets the 
statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct.” The husband was a Naval 
Petty Officer, and the matter ultimately ended up in the hands of federal law 
enforcement agents. I think it is useful to examine McCoy as a classic outer 
limits case without consideration of any possible federal interest in the 
conduct of Naval personnel. After all, the husband’s status would make no 
difference in determining the reach of the statute. Although the court of 
appeals referred to both a facial and an as-applied challenge, its analytical 
focus is solely on the latter.427 The court applied428 the four-part test 
discussed above.429 Although this test is no longer operational after Raich, it 
does involve examining the application of the economic/commercial line, as 
well as questions of the definition of the subclass to which that line applies in 
as-applied challenges. As treated by the McCoy Court, the two issues are 
closely interrelated, as they were in Raich.  
 
(1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Holston, 343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Kallestad, 
236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000). 
422 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000).  
423 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). 
424 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
425 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 
(2005); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 
321 (2005). 
426 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115. 
427 Id. at 1119–29. 
428 Id. at 1117–30. 
429 See supra notes 316–18. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected outright any role for the jurisdictional element 
relied on by the government: a requirement that the materials used to produce 
the depiction have been transported in commerce by any means.430 It found 
that the jurisdictional element failed to limit the statute in any way, and that it 
encompasses virtually every case imaginable.431 Like other courts of appeals, 
it saw intrastate pornography as presenting a category three substantial 
effects issue.432 The opinion focused on that through consideration of the 
nature of the defendant’s activities as compared to those in Wickard.433 It 
noted the uncertain economic/commercial background of that case,434 but 
quoted Morrison to the effect that “in every case where we have sustained 
federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard v. 
Filburn . . . the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial 
character.”435 For the Ninth Circuit there was a substantial difference 
between the wheat in Wickard and the pornographic material in McCoy. As 
to the former, “its very existence had an economic effect,” while “McCoy’s 
photo does not have any plausible economic impact on the child pornography 
industry.”436 In other words, the photo was neither potentially economic nor 
did its purely intrastate possession affect federal regulation of interstate 
commerce. The Ninth Circuit devoted considerable attention to rebutting the 
Third Circuit decision in United States v. Rodia,437 which rested in part on a 
notion of “addiction,” that is, that “the possession of ‘homegrown’ 
pornography may well stimulate a further interest in pornography that 
immediately or eventually animates demand for interstate pornography.”438 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected any fungibility analysis of the family 
pornographic photo.439  
 
 
430 This jurisdictional element states that any child pornography “that has been 
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . . or that 
was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported . . . by any 
means, including by computer” falls within the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) 
(2000). 
431 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). The court stated 
that “the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here.” Id. at 1125. 
432 E.g., United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1317 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003). 
433 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1120–33. 
434 Id. at 1120. 
435 Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000)). 
436 Id. at 1121 n.11. 
437 United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 465 (3d Cir. 1999). 
438 Id. at 477–78. 
439 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). Perhaps 
unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit compared homegrown pornography to possession of a 
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Although some circuits have apparently rejected the possibility of as-
applied challenges to the pornography statute,440 the Ninth Circuit in McCoy 
followed the majority of courts of appeals in allowing an as-applied 
challenge.441 The definition of the class is inherently bound up with the 
determination as to the economic/commercial nature of the activity. If this 
latter hurdle had been overcome, the next step would have been to measure 
the aggregate effect of the class on interstate commerce. The description of 
the class is key. The Ninth Circuit first described the class in the following 
highly general terms that seem so closely related to the legal standard as to 
prejudge the answer:  
At issue here is whether a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
may constitutionally reach non–commercial, non-economic individual 
conduct that is purely intrastate in nature, when there is no reasonable basis 
for concluding that the conduct had or was intended to have any significant 
interstate connection or any substantive effect on interstate commerce.442
Beyond the fact that it states the proposition in a manner that refutes it, 
this description does not help the analysis by singling out the particular 
nature of the defendants’ activities. The court later defined the class-of-
activity more specifically as “non-commercial, non-economic, simple 
intrastate possession of photographs for personal use.”443 The court made 
clear that its analysis applied to McCoy and to others similarly situated. In 
order to strengthen the case for treating this class as outside the reach of 
federal law, the Court might have emphasized even further the family 
dimension of the photograph.444 Factual emphasis is important in contending 
that an activity is beyond the outer limits of the federal commerce power. 
What is the impact of Raich and the subsequent remands on McCoy? 
There are two guideposts in attempting to formulate an answer. The first is a 
comparison of the class whose as-applied challenge was considered in Raich 
to the class presented in McCoy. In Raich, the Ninth Circuit defined the class 
 
single marijuana cigarette and the possibility that that could lead to further addiction. Id. 
As for the legislative history, the Court found it inconclusive. Id. at 1128.  
440 United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Holston, 
343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001).  
441 United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 
402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. 
Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 374 
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).  
442 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1117. 
443 Id. at 1133. 
444 The Court made passing references to the family dimension. Id. at 1122, 1132. 
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of activities as “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use 
of marijuana for personal, medical purposes on the advice of a physician and 
in accordance with state law.”445 At the Supreme Court level, Justice 
Stevens, for the majority, whittled down this class to “the intrastate, 
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana.”446 If one 
substitutes production for cultivation and child pornography for marijuana, 
the two classes look remarkably similar, particularly if one views 
pornographic materials as fungible. It is also important to remember that we 
are dealing with a particular form of federal commercial regulation: a ban on 
an activity or product. Thus it seems entirely possible that a court applying 
Raich will rely on the Wickard analysis to conclude that the personal product 
can become part of the commercial market and/or that the consumer of this 
product could move into that market as well.447 The counter-argument can be 
stated as follows: the family nature of the photograph in a case like McCoy is 
a strong point of differentiation. The possessor would not want it to fall into 
non-family hands. Whether this distinction will be sufficient is, at the 
moment, an open question.  
It is at this point that the second guidepost becomes important. One of 
the cases vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Raich is the 
March 2005 decision of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Smith.448 In 
Smith, the defendant was engaged in both production and possession of what 
the court viewed as intrastate child pornography.449 The Eleventh Circuit 
engaged in an extensive analysis of Wickard, in the context of “purely 
intrastate production and possession for personal use . . . .”450 The key to the 
analysis is the difference between wheat, which is inherently part of a 
national market, and obscene photographs which, in the court’s view, are not. 
I will quote at length from the Circuit’s treatment of the Wickard analysis:  
Even if, in the aggregate, offenders like Smith somehow impact an 
interstate market by producing child pornography for their own use, 
Congress is clearly not concerned with the supply of child pornography for 
the purpose of avoiding surpluses and shortages or for the purpose of 
stimulating its trade at increased prices. . . . The conclusion is thus 
 
 
445 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
446 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (quoting Raich, 352 F.3d at 
1229). 
447 Id. at 2207 n.28. 
448 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 
(2005). 
449 Id. at 1315–18. 
450 Id. at 1321. 
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inevitable that the statutes under which Smith was convicted are not 
concerned with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.451
This analysis may not give appropriate weight to the Wickard 
comparison in the context of a ban of a product as opposed to a price 
regulation scheme. There are two additional factors that weaken the opinion 
in Smith. It relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision in Raich.452 In 
addition, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that if Smith were to be 
prosecuted, that prosecution should come from the state, rather than from the 
federal government.453 Thus, one could conclude from the remand, following 
almost directly on the rendering of the Raich decision, that Smith is a prime 
candidate for reversal. It may not follow, however, that such an action would 
carry over to a case like McCoy. Smith was a commercial operator who paid 
at least some of his subjects and, when arrested, was in possession of 1768 
pictures.454 Perhaps the familial and personal nature of the possession of one 
photograph is enough to differentiate McCoy from the activities of a small-
time hustler like the defendant in Smith. If so, there is a line that will be 
developed through as-applied challenges. If not, if on similar facts the next 
McCoy leads to a successful prosecution, Raich will have gone far to extend 
the outer limits of federal power to conduct what would seem, to many, 
beyond that power.455 To those who find this troubling, the answer may well 
lie not in the Commerce Clause, but in other parts of the Constitution, 
notably the Due Process Clause, that might be interpreted to protect the 
activity in question from prosecution by any government. Short of that, it is 
true that one can probably rely on congressional drafting, prosecutorial 
discretion, and a shortage of federal resources to obviate the prospect of 
federal prosecution of quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers. 
Still, for those who seek some form of demarcation in a government of 
enumerated and limited powers, the prospect of a successful prosecution in 
the next McCoy case is not a comforting one. 
 
 
451 Id. at 1318 (citation omitted). 
452 Id. 
453 Id. at 1327–28. 
454 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2938 (2005). 
455 See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 158–59 (discussing outer limits 
problem). 
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V. CONCLUSION—RAICH AND THE NEW FEDERALISM 
The Supreme Court decision in Gonzalez v. Raich represents a setback 
for the New Federalism. The Court had a golden opportunity to extend that 
concept by upholding a Ninth Circuit decision that limited intrastate 
applications of the Federal Controlled Substances Act.456 Particularly 
noteworthy was the fact that state law would have permitted the conduct at 
issue, thus permitting the state to serve a classic “laboratory” function. 
Instead, the Supreme Court reversed, upholding the supremacy and sweep of 
federal law. Totally absent from the majority opinion were such staples of 
New Federalism rhetoric as state sovereignty, spheres of autonomy, and a 
paramount state role in criminal law.457 Also absent was any suggestion of 
federalism itself as a separate and independent concept with constitutional 
force.458 This Article contends that the decision is a setback for the New 
Federalism, but not a rollback.459 The result is not Lopez-Lite or the non-
federalism of Justices Breyer and Souter. The Court upheld the 
economic/commercial line for establishing the validity of federal regulations 
that purport to deal with matters having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. The Article also argues that, although the nonattenuation 
principle does not appear in the majority opinion, it is implicit in the Court’s 
expressed need for a limiting category of federal authority such as the 
economic/commercial line.460
Raich helps answer some questions about the future of federal criminal 
law. It is likely that that law will continue to grow in a manner that overlaps 
with state criminal statutes.461 Any attempt at a sharp demarcation through 
separate spheres seems doomed. Raich also appears to settle an important 
dispute by confirming that as-applied challenges can be brought to intrastate 
applications of class-of-activities statutes.462 However, it must be noted that 
the Court’s opinion raises doubts as to how often those challenges will 
succeed. It is clear that statutes with jurisdictional elements, as opposed to 
the class-of-activity statute in Raich, pose serious conceptual problems, many 
of which have yet to be addressed by the Court in the post-Lopez era. In 
 
 
456 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
457 See supra Part II.B. 
458 Id. 
459 See supra Part III.A-B. 
460 See supra Part IV.C. 
461 See supra Part II.B. 
462 See supra Part II.B. 
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particular, it seems unlikely that the Court would countenance a use of 
jurisdictional elements based on the channels or instrumentalities categories 
of commerce that completely undercuts what it tried to accomplish in Lopez. 
One must admit that the answer is not clear. Even less clear are the problems 
of the outer limits of federal statutes. Are there instances of private, intrastate 
conduct that federal law cannot reach, despite the presence of a generally 
valid statute that seems to condemn them? 
Beyond the federal criminal law, broader questions arise concerning the 
impact of Raich on the New Federalism.463 I have used that term to refer to 
efforts by the current Court to strengthen the state role within the overall 
federal balance. As many observers have noted,464 the concept encompasses 
a range of areas, some constitutional, some sub-constitutional, and some 
statutory. One of the most important dimensions of the New Federalism 
debate is that there will be no clear resolution, just as there can never be any 
clear resolution of American federalism. The decisions of the Court placed 
under this rubric are not what Justice Souter condescendingly referred to as 
an attempt to return to “[t]he federalism of an earlier time.”465 Rather, they 
are an attempt to maintain a balance between the two levels in a complex, 
highly intergovermentalized system.466 Raich will not be counted as a New 
Federalism decision,467 despite elements of the concept that remain alive 
within it. In particular, those who support the Court’s previous efforts to 
strengthen the state role are likely to criticize the decision for its heavy 
reliance on Wickard v. Filburn.468 At the doctrinal level, conservatives may 
criticize Raich for failing to clarify the relationship between Wickard and 
Lopez, that is, utilizing the latter to limit the former. However, the case 
reminds us of an equally important element of the dynamic: the supremacy of 
the federal government, acting within its enumerated powers, is part of the 
glue that holds the system together. 
 
 
463 See supra Part IV.D. 
464 E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002); R. Shep Melnick, 
Deregulating the States: The Political Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in 
INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 69–95 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Robert Kagan eds., 2005). 
465 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
466 See generally, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 
MICH L. REV. 813, 813 (1998). 
467 See Randy E. Barnett, William Rehnquist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at A28 
(criticizing Raich as contrary to the New Federalism). 
468 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
